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CITIZENSHIP FEDERALISM
EMILY R. CHERTOFF*
Immigration federalism has attracted overwhelming attention from
scholars and advocates in recent years. Despite this, the scholarship has not
fully explored the outer limits of states’ power to regulate noncitizens. This
Article attempts to provide one account of these outer limits. To do so, it uses
as a case study an important group of noncitizens with a complex relationship
to state (and national) community. It is the first systematic analysis of the
effects of state law on former immigrants to the United States, a group that
has grown into the millions with increased deportations and voluntary outmigration. It is also the first treatment in legal scholarship of two substantive
state-law legal issues that are harming these millions of former immigrants.
Building on these descriptive observations, this Article offers a
theoretical framework to guide state immigration law and policymaking that
emphasizes states’ powers to define community differently than the federal
government. This framework, which the Article names “citizenship
federalism” to highlight its linkages to and divergences from the antecedent
concept of “immigration federalism,” focuses attention on states’ power to
adopt different underlying values and criteria than the federal system does
when deciding which noncitizens to place within the boundaries of
community. This Article focuses on states’ power to challenge federal law’s
reliance on territoriality, which federal law treats as the key boundary
determining which noncitizens are within our national community.
Citizenship federalism opens up significant possibilities for academics and
practitioners alike, both for understanding the states’ role in constructing
political and social membership and for moving towards a new generation
of state-level immigration policy and advocacy.

© 2022 Emily R. Chertoff.
* J.D., Yale Law School, 2017, and incoming Academic Fellow at Columbia Law School. I
am grateful to Molly Goss and Cathleen Caron for early discussions that helped to set the direction
of this Article. Thank you to Muneer Ahmad, Ashraf Ahmed, Adam Bradlow, Anne Daily, Linda
Greenhouse, Hilary Ledwell, Zachary Manfredi, Hiroshi Motomura, Thomas Scott-Railton, and
Reva Siegel for conversations and comments at various stages in the drafting process, and to the
Promise Institute for Human Rights at UCLA School of Law for its support. All errors are my own.

503

504

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:503

INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 504
I. SUDDENLY “STATELESS”: DEPORTATION, STATE LAWS, AND THE
DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS ............................................................... 510
A. Property Ownership: Foreclosure Law and the Deprivation of
Property Rights ....................................................................... 513
B. Proof of Identity: Due Process in State Identification Laws and
Reintegration in the Country of Origin ................................... 519
C. Parental Rights: Termination of Parental Rights and the
Deprivation of the Right to Family Relationships .................. 524
II. CITIZENSHIP FEDERALISM: HOW STATES CAN REDEFINE THE SUBJECTS
OF RIGHTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY .............................. 532
A. Immigration Federalism: Reacting to the Federal Government,
Replicating a Paradigm ........................................................... 534
B. Citizenship Federalism: Redefining the Subject of Rights ........ 546
1. The Activist’s or Policymaker’s Perspective ...................... 546
2. Implications for Immigration, Migration, and Federalism
Scholars ............................................................................. 549
Immigration and Migration ............................................... 549
For Federalism Scholars .................................................... 553
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................. 554
INTRODUCTION
The recent election of Joseph R. Biden has eased, at least to some
degree, the pressure the past four years placed on immigrants and the U.S.
immigration system.
However, the roiling political conflict over
immigration, identity, national membership, and belonging that helped drive
the 2016 election victory of Donald J. Trump remains unresolved. This
fissure is only deepening as parts of the Republican and Democratic parties
appear to converge on some economic policies, increasing the likelihood that
identity and membership issues will become the primary axis of dispute
between the parties in future elections.1 The central question that structures
all of immigration law—who is within community, within democracy, and
worthy of the protections of our laws and our society’s safety net—is as
vexed and as essential as it ever has been in our history.
But by what process can we hope to devise answers to the age-old
question of what we as a national community owe, and to whom?2 Over the
past four years, immigration advocates have largely focused their attention
1. See infra Section II.B.1.
2. See infra Section II.A.
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on the states, and how they make immigration-related laws that set the
bounds of community.3 Though many advocates—and scholars—have
turned their attention, for now, to the federal stage and the power it affords
to make high-level policy, what happens at the state level continues to be
essential to the deep forms of change national immigration advocates seek.
Even after four years of intense focus on immigration federalism, we are only
beginning to appreciate how much power states possess to bring noncitizens
within what I call the “circle of concern.”4
This Article identifies an important capacity of states to contest and
challenge our assumptions about the boundaries of community, a practice I
call “citizenship federalism.” In service of explaining citizenship federalism,
the Article first clarifies the power that the states exercise over millions of
people outside our borders. It is the first piece of legal scholarship to identify
the systemic effects of state law on the several million people who have been
deported from the United States in the past two decades alone,5 a group that

3. See Julia Preston, How the Dreamers Learned to Play Politics, POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 9,
2017),
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/09/09/dreamers-daca-learned-to-playpolitics-215588 (recounting pivot by major national immigration organization United We Dream to
state-level advocacy during second Obama Administration term and Trump Administration).
4. The “circle of concern” is the group of people whose substantive outcomes our political
community considers relevant and that our public policy therefore seeks to protect or improve. In
other words, the circle of concern is the group of all members of a polity’s community. Critically,
people can be members of a political community without possessing full political rights in that
community—for example, children. Since noncitizen immigrants do not possess full political rights
in our national community (nor do they necessarily seek these rights) regardless of what policies
states might choose to make, I have found it necessary to rely on another term. When a society
treats someone as being within the circle of concern, very often it does so by either offering that
person rights directly, or by helping effectuate their rights within another society. For instance, this
Article talks about how states can help former immigrants access and update identity and
biographical documents. By doing so, states would help protect the rights of these former
immigrants not in their state or in the United States, but in their country of return (e.g., by making
it possible to enroll in school there).
5. The precise size of this group is difficult to estimate. Over the past two decades, there have
been well over 6.2 million deportations from the United States (the real figure is significantly higher
because the estimate does not include deportations in 2020 or 2021). Table 39. Aliens Removed or
Returned: Fiscal Years 1892 to 2019, DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 28, 2020),
https://www.dhs.gov/immigration-statistics/yearbook/2019/table39.
However, since some
immigrants reenter and are deported multiple times, the actual number of deported people is likely
somewhat lower, though still in the multiple millions. See, e.g., U.S. SENT’G COMM’N, ILLEGAL
REENTRY
OFFENSES
(2015),
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-andpublications/research-projects-and-surveys/immigration/2015_Illegal-Reentry-Report.pdf
(documenting charges of illegal reentry, which cannot be charged without a previous deportation,
in nearly 18,500 cases in the fiscal year 2013, representing a subset of all people in that year who
returned to the United States after a prior deportation). Notably, this figure does not include any of
the people who left the United States under pressure from the government but without a final order
of removal, a group of millions of people in itself.
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is only growing in size as deportations have dramatically increased over that
time and U.S. interior enforcement has become increasingly harsh.6
When it comes to this group, determining “what we owe” as a national
community is particularly complicated. Even once outside our borders,
former immigrants retain ties of the kind we often associate with membership
in a polity: family, property, culture, and even loyalty. States do not control
whether these people can return to our country, but they exercise power over
many aspects of deported peoples’ lives: for instance, whether they can
reunite with their children, derive value from their property, and integrate
into their country of origin or deportation.7 Because states have failed to act
to protect this group, they have undercut these former immigrants and their
ties here with tragic consequences. Based partly on conversations with
advocates working in the countries of origin,8 this Article proposes
interventions at three levels—property ownership, proof of identity, and
parental rights—by which states can begin to assume their responsibilities
towards individuals who are still in important ways members of the
community, regardless of their geographical location. Legal scholars have
noted the parental rights issue,9 but this Article is the first piece of legal
scholarship analyzing the property and proof of identity issues described
within.
Because states exert control over former immigrants’ rights and
freedoms even after they leave this country, states have the potential to
6. A critical exception, besides Caldwell’s book, is the work of Daniel Kanstroom, who has
long focused on the problems facing immigrants after deportation, with particular attention to
challenging wrongful deportations in a system where very few immigrants are able to continue
pursuing their legal case after deportation. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom & Jessica Chicco, The
Forgotten Deported: A Declaration on the Rights of Expelled and Deported Persons, 47 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL’Y 537 (2015); DANIEL KANSTROOM, AFTERMATH: DEPORTATION LAW AND THE
NEW AMERICAN DIASPORA (2012). More recently, the scholar Beth Caldwell has offered a detailed
account of the lives of former immigrants reintegrating in Mexico. BETH C. CALDWELL, DEPORTED
AMERICANS: LIFE AFTER DEPORTATION TO MEXICO (2019). Journalists have also periodically
reported on this group. See, e.g., Brooke Jarvis, The Deported Americans, CAL. SUNDAY MAG.
(Jan. 31, 2019), https://story.californiasunday.com/deported-americans (noting over “600,000 U.S.born children of undocumented parents live in Mexico”).
7. For clarity, this Article will use “country of origin” throughout to refer to the countries
where former immigrants have been deported. However, it is worth noting that in some cases, the
United States has deported immigrants not to their country of birth or origin, but to a third country,
a practice that became institutionalized as a policy during the presidency of Donald Trump. See,
e.g., Aaron Reichlin-Melnick, Biden Administration Ends ‘Safe Third Country’ Agreements,
IMMIGR. IMPACT (Feb. 8, 2021), https://immigrationimpact.com/2021/02/08/safe-third-countryagreement-biden/.
8. I am deeply indebted to a number of advocates whose patient explanations of the on-theground problems they have seen were critical to the early development of this Article back in 2018,
particularly Cathleen Caron of Justice in Motion and Molly Goss of Instituto para las Mujeres en la
Migración (“IMUMI”). These organizations are among the few that consistently work with postdeportation immigrants to resolve their ongoing U.S. legal issues.
9. See infra Section I.C.
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engage in “citizenship federalism”10—the practice of setting different
boundaries for who is within the community than the federal government
does. The main normative contribution of this Article, elaborated in Part II,
is to separate the immigration federalism11 states already practice from the
distinct, more foundationally probing strategy of citizenship federalism.
Where immigration federalism addresses which rights or benefits should be
extended to immigrants already on the territory and thus within the federal
government’s circle of concern, citizenship federalism expressly seeks to
modify the boundaries of the community by extending the circle of concern
to others not yet included, in this case, by going beyond the territorial
paradigm to include former immigrants.12 The power to vary from the federal
10. This Article relies on established theorizations of the relationship between states and the
federal government for its models. Domestic legal scholarship on federalism in the United States
has developed a broad range of models for conceptualizing the interaction between different levels
of government. See Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1552–
61 (2012). This Article relies on one of the older concepts in federalism, and one that has at times
fallen out of favor or been attacked: the idea that states are “laboratories of democracy.” See New
State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve
as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the
country.”); see also Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 430–31 (1998). In this model (as the concept has
developed over decades), the small size and diversity of the states make them uniquely suited to test
innovations in government and policymaking. Where testing shows these changes are successful
and desirable, they may spread to other states or the federal government. The laboratories of
democracy concept can help to explain, for instance, the spread of marriage equality from a few
early-adopting states to the federal government and most states in the Union. Indeed, this concept
played into the movement’s strategy. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Pluralism and Distrust: How
Courts Can Support Democracy by Lowering the Stakes of Politics, 114 YALE L.J. 1279, 1327
(2005).
11. This term, where defined in the literature, has been given an expansive meaning, but as I
demonstrate in Section II.A, the range of actual policymaking that falls under this category is
relatively narrow, primarily addressing itself to cooperation or noncooperation with immigration
enforcement and to benefits or entitlements. Numerous scholars have written influentially about
immigration federalism. See, e.g., Stella Burch Elias, The New Immigration Federalism, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 703, 706 (2013) (arguing for expanding the definition of “immigration federalism” to
“encompass all multi-governmental rulemaking pertaining to immigrants and immigration—
including rulemaking intended to foster immigrant inclusion”); see also Peter L. Markowitz,
Undocumented No More: The Power of State Citizenship, 67 STAN. L. REV. 869, 906–11 (2015)
(arguing for expanded state citizenship as a means to help immigrants access benefits and civil rights
protections as well as expressive inclusion within the political community); Hiroshi Motomura,
Federalism, International Human Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV.
1361, 1361 (1999) (defining immigration federalism as “states and localities play[ing a role] in
making and implementing law and policy relating to immigration and immigrants”); PRATHEEPAN
GULASEKARAM & S. KARTHICK RAMAKRISHNAN, THE NEW IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM 6–7
(2015) (assessing gradual expansion of immigration federalism and differentiation of pro-immigrant
and anti-immigrant variants).
12. The vast existing literature on immigration federalism talks about or at least implies that
state immigration regulation articulates certain values, but rarely does this literature explicitly ask
the further question of whether states can and should exercise a broader power to re-define the
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government on whose substantive outcomes we care about, and who should
be the subject of rights, is what I mean by “citizenship federalism.”13
Part I of this Article details a set of actions on property, parental rights,
and proof of identity that are within state control and not preempted by
federal law.14 Yet despite their interest in legislating on immigration, state
lawmakers have not made policy in these areas. Part II advances a theory of
why this is the case. States continue to underplay their powers to define the
American community, I argue, because states’ conception of who is entitled
to the protection of our laws matches up too closely with the federal
conception. In general, the federal government treats two groups of people
as within the circle of concern: citizens, and noncitizens on the territory of
the state.15 People who fall outside of these groups enjoy limited protection
rights-holder. The exception, a significant intellectual antecedent of this Article, is the existing
literature on noncitizen voting by immigrants, which more explicitly addresses how states and
localities draw the boundaries of the political community. See Markowitz, supra note 11, at 906–
11; Jamin B. Raskin, Legal Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutional and Theoretical
Meanings of Alien Suffrage, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1452 (1993) (addressing relationship between
extension of noncitizen voting and perceptions and reality of political membership, and noting
connection of these questions to democratic theory); Gerald M. Rosberg, Aliens and Equal
Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1092, 1111–15 (1977) (questioning why
noncitizens should be excluded from political community of the state via deprivation of the right to
vote); Tara Kini, Comment, Sharing the Vote: Noncitizen Voting Rights in Local School Board
Elections, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 271, 299–316 (2005) (suggesting political tactics for persuading
standing voters to expand the political community to noncitizen voters in local elections). Recently,
New York City appears increasingly likely to authorize noncitizen voting in local elections, though
the expansion will be limited to lawful permanent residents and immigrants with work authorization.
See Jeffery C. Mays & Annie Correal, New York Moves to Allow 800,000 Noncitizens to Vote in
Local
Elections,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
23,
2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/23/nyregion/noncitizen-voting-rights-nyc.html.
13. This concept draws on Cristina Rodríguez’s influential earlier work framing immigration
federalism as the states’ mechanism to regulate immigrant inclusion and integration. See generally
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV.
567 (2008). This Article asks how the integrative capacities Rodríguez identifies can extend across
borders and beyond the group of noncitizens the Federal Constitution defines as potentially worthy
of concern. When states extend these capacities across borders, they are answering a somewhat
different question—not whether and how we should integrate immigrants already here in the United
States, but what our relationship should be to immigrants who are no longer (or not yet) in this
country.
14. Preemption generally does not bar states from regulating immigrants in areas historically
wholly reserved to their control, and though it sometimes sets an antidiscrimination floor, it has not
stopped some states and localities from enacting a variety of restrictionist measures in property and
zoning laws. See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratories of Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration
Power, Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 509–11 (2001) (detailing
relevance of preemption for local anti-immigrant lawmaking and noting “leeway” for states to
regulate undocumented immigrants).
15. The Supreme Court has expressly noted that “once an alien enters the country, the legal
circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States,
including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”
Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001); see also Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886). The constitutional law of alienage discrimination represents one major set of protections
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from nearly any action the U.S. government or its agents might decide to take
against them.16
I conclude that though states have taken critically important steps to
protect some immigrants, at a conceptual level, state laws do not draw the
circle of concern differently than federal law. Like federal law, state law
offers noncitizens significant rights protections so long as they remain on the
state’s territory, and very few if they travel (or are deported) outside of it—a
state of affairs that stems from the reactive nature of state immigration
legislation.17 States have accepted this territorial paradigm and other aspects
of the federal view as a given, and thus do not yet see as part of their
responsibility many noncitizens with profound ties to both individual states
and the United States. In closing, this Article explains why citizenship
federalism holds promise both for domestic immigration advocates seeking
a practical path to change in the immigration system and for immigration
scholars wondering what is next after years of rearguard action against the
federal government.18
Part I of this Article lays out three areas where state inaction directly
harms deported immigrants. Part II is divided into two sections. The first
explores the gap between how states perform immigration federalism now
and the reforms proposed in Part I. It concludes that states, like the federal
government, conform to a territorial model when deciding which noncitizens
are within their circle of concern. This model, I explain, is pervasive both in
U.S. constitutional law and across world legal systems. However, in the
United States, and perhaps in other federal systems as well, states may
challenge and contest this model by using citizenship federalism as a
for noncitizens on the territory of the state, under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (protecting right of noncitizen children to attend public
school); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 376 (1971) (forbidding state from discriminating
based on alienage in social safety net benefits). Noncitizens on the territory of the state also receive
heightened due process protections in removal proceedings, whereas noncitizens off of U.S.
territory have long had virtually no recourse if they are denied admission. Compare Landon v.
Plasencia, 459 U.S. 21, 32–33 (1982), with Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766–67 (1972).
In addition, noncitizens on state territory are entitled to a variety of other constitutional rights. See
infra Section II.A.
16. In recent years, the Supreme Court has expressly held that noncitizens not on U.S. territory
possess a narrow right to seek judicial review of their indefinite detention by the United States via
the writ of habeas corpus. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008) (“Petitioners . . . are
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”). For practical
purposes, however, the federal government’s power over noncitizens not on U.S. territory is broad.
For instance, under U.S. constitutional law, setting aside for a moment any obligations that may be
imposed by international law, an official acting under color of law may kill a noncitizen who is not
on U.S. territory, even without a valid justification. See Hernandez v. Mesa, 140 S. Ct. 735, 741
(2020) (finding no Bivens remedy for Mexican teenager killed by Border Patrol agent who shot
across U.S.-Mexico border).
17. See infra Section II.A.
18. See infra Section II.B.
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framework. The second section of Part II adopts a broader lens to examine
the role that citizenship federalism could play both for domestic immigration
advocacy and for scholars of immigration, global migration, and federalism.
I. SUDDENLY “STATELESS”: DEPORTATION, STATE LAWS, AND THE
DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
In 2004, an immigrant named Calvin James was deported from Jersey
City, New Jersey, to his native country of Jamaica, where he had not lived
since age twelve.19 After a rocky youth that saw him spend eighteen months
in prison for dealing marijuana, Calvin had grown into a devoted family man,
with a job as a bicycle messenger in New York, where he was his boss’s star
employee.20 Together with his partner Kathy, he was raising a six-year-old
son, Josh, and was by all accounts a great dad.21 But because of his prior
conviction, a court had issued a deportation order for Calvin in 1996 or
1997.22 About eight years later—well after he had established a life with his
partner and son—ICE agents came looking for him at his house one
evening.23
For most immigration lawyers and judges, an immigrant’s story ends
when they are placed on a plane or a bus back to their country of origin.24
Few immigrants have the resources to continue fighting an immigration case
after deportation. But as the reporting of two journalists who interviewed
Calvin for an article on families’ reunification struggles makes clear,
deportation was not the end of the story for Calvin, Kathy, or Josh.25
When Calvin landed in Kingston he was homeless.26 Unlike many
deportees, who may remain indigent for weeks, months, or even permanently,
he soon found work as a security guard and a truck driver.27 Despite working
sixteen-hour days, however, Calvin’s take-home pay on Jamaican wages was
19. Seth Freed Wessler & Julianne Hing, Torn Apart: Struggling to Stay Together After
Deportation, in BEYOND WALLS AND CAGES: PRISONS, BORDERS, AND GLOBAL CRISIS 152, 157
(Jenna M. Loyd, Matt Mitchelson & Andrew Burridge eds., 2012). For those interested in learning
more about the human stories behind every deportation, Beth Caldwell’s book, Deported
Americans, also contains a broad and disturbing set of anecdotes, running through the entire text,
about the effects of a family member’s deportation on both the former immigrant and their family
in the United States. CALDWELL, supra note 6.
20. Wessler & Hing, supra note 19, at 158–59.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 158.
23. Id. at 152.
24. This blind spot has a parallel in the criminal system: Many lawyers and judges see
conviction as the end of the story, but law continues to structure the condemned person’s life for
many years after, in prison and later reentry.
25. See Wessler & Hing, supra note 19.
26. Id. at 152–53.
27. Id. at 156.
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about $75 a week—not enough to bring Kathy and Josh to join him, as he
had hoped.28 Three years after Calvin’s deportation, Kathy and Josh were
evicted from their apartment after Kathy lost her job and, without a second
household income, the family wound up at a homeless shelter.29 Citing the
family’s housing instability, a case worker told Kathy that the New York City
Administration for Children’s Services might initiate proceedings in the child
welfare system to take Josh away—which, at the same time, would strip
Calvin of his right to see Josh ever again.30 At the time the story ended, Kathy
and Calvin were both on a path to having their parental rights terminated31—
a sad chain of events rooted in Calvin’s deportation, and potentially ending
with him losing his right to ever see his child again.
Calvin James’s story illustrates the particular, significant, and yet
virtually unrecognized state-law harms that occur when a long-term U.S.
resident is deported. To take Calvin’s case as an example, the laws governing
child custody and parental rights that the family’s social worker threatened
to invoke are almost entirely under the control of the states.32 Sadly and
ironically, state laws are more likely to complicate the lives of former
immigrants who were long-term residents of the United States, a group
generally thought of as most deserving by lawmakers, judges, and the public,
because they have more ties and more resources tied up here.33
An observer might reasonably ask: “Isn’t this the way the system is
supposed to work?” After all, we are habituated to think about removing
someone from their life, family, and property as the natural “collateral”
harms of removal or deportation from the United States—an unavoidable part
of what the deported person obviously stands to lose as a result of choosing
to be in the United States in violation of the law.
This misunderstanding has been naturalized by our current immigration
system. However, as this Part explains in more detail, these are emphatically

28. Id.
29. Id. at 160.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. See, e.g., Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693–95 (1992) (affirming “domestic
relations exception” to federal jurisdiction over family law cases grounded in longstanding state
control in this area of law); see also Sylvia Law, Families and Federalism, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y
175, 180–82 (2000) (laying out contemporary justification for ongoing state preeminence in the
domain of family law).
33. In Cristina M. Rodríguez’s formulation, the people in this group are “functional Americans”
given the depth of their various ties to this country. See Cristina M. Rodríguez, Immigration, Civil
Rights & the Evolution of the People, DÆDALUS, Summer 2013, at 228, 235. State law affects longterm residents more because they are vastly more likely to have developed financial and personal
ties that make it much more difficult to leave this country. See Clara Long, US Deporting More
Long-Term
Residents,
HUM.
RTS.
WATCH
(Apr.
21,
2018,
7:00
PM),
https://www.hrw.org/news/2018/04/21/us-deporting-more-long-term-residents.
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not necessary consequences. For instance, permanently losing contact with
one’s child after deportation is not a given. Thousands of children migrate
away from the United States with a noncitizen parent every year, and
thousands more stay but retain close ties to deported parents in the hopes of
being reunited someday. Critically, it is states, and not the federal
government, that play a major role in enforcing these collateral consequences
against former immigrants, deepening the harms of deportation. States
therefore also have the opportunity, and the responsibility, to reverse these
harms.
Available statistics demonstrate that the problems set out in this Part of
the Article potentially affect a vast group of people. For instance, nearly a
third of this country’s eleven million undocumented immigrants—to say
nothing of lawful permanent residents—own a home in the United States,
either alone or with a U.S. relative.34 Over four million U.S. citizen children
live with at least one undocumented parent;35 and over a two-year period,
approximately half a million U.S. citizen children had at least one parent
deported.36 In Mexico alone there are approximately 600,000 U.S. citizen
children attending school37—some of whose parents voluntarily returned, and
some of whose parents were deported. The United States is also increasingly
deporting immigrants who have been here for many years and are therefore
more likely to have the kinds of financial and personal ties governed by state
law.38 As the Trump Administration increased interior immigration
policing39 and adopted policies of indiscriminate enforcement,40 the chance
of long-term residents being placed in proceedings may have risen as well.
This Part explains how three areas of state law—laws governing
property, parental rights, and proof of identity—have hampered deportees
from rebuilding their lives and providing for their families. This Article is
the first piece of legal scholarship to undertake a systematic review of the
34. Profile of the Unauthorized Population: United States, MIGRATION POL’Y INST.,
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/unauthorized-immigrant-population/state/US (last visited
Nov. 7, 2021) (data extracted Aug. 6, 2018).
35. U.S. Citizen Children Impacted by Immigration Enforcement, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL 1
(June
2021),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/us_citizen_children_imp
acted_by_immigration_enforcement_0.pdf.
36. Id.
37. See Jarvis, supra note 6.
38. See State and County Details on Deportation Proceedings in Immigration Court, TRAC
IMMIGR., http://trac.syr.edu/phptools/immigration/nta. The data for this Article was gathered using
TRAC’s tool on December 5 and December 6, 2019.
39. See Rodrigo Dominguez-Villegas, Protection and Reintegration: Mexico Reforms
Migration Agenda in an Increasingly Complex Era, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar. 7, 2019),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/protection-and-reintegration-mexico-reforms-migrationagenda.
40. See Long, supra note 33.
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ways state laws impact deported immigrants. Indeed, two of the three issues
this Part of the Article outlines—the harms to deported immigrants from
home foreclosure and inadequate state identity documentation—are new to
legal scholarship. The third issue, termination of parental rights after
deportation, has received attention in family law scholarship, mainly as it
relates to the legal standards governing termination and “the best interests of
the child,” but it has not entered discussions about immigration federalism or
theoretical debates around the distribution of rights to noncitizens.
Finally, I want to emphasize that the below is not meant to be an
exhaustive list of all laws states could reform to benefit former immigrants.41
The very concept of citizenship federalism that these reforms illustrate is
new, and the area would benefit from further exploration. Instead, I hope to
open a conversation about the powers states have to grant or deny rights
outside the more familiar forms of immigration federalism. As advocates
engage with citizenship federalism at the state level, other applications may
suggest themselves.
A. Property Ownership: Foreclosure Law and the Deprivation of
Property Rights
Property rights have an important place within the framework of
individual liberties envisioned by our constitutional system, though they are
primarily governed by state law.42 Similarly, international law protects
individual property rights, as do most nation-states’ legal regimes.43 Many
immigrants, temporary and permanent, immigrate partly to access the ability
to accumulate wealth—so-called “economic migration.”44 The ability to
accrue, retain, and store value in property helps immigrants and their families
to improve their material situation in the United States, as well as (eventually)
at home, as in situations where older immigrants retire or otherwise return to
41. This Article does not talk about landlord-tenant law, for instance, which tends to be local,
and which does not contain deportation protections for relatives of immigrants, despite anecdotal
evidence (like the case of Kathy and Josh) that losing an immigrant earner to deportation can cause
U.S. relatives to face eviction.
42. See U.S. CONST. amend. V, XIV; see also Frank I. Michelman, Property as a Constitutional
Right, 38 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1097, 1098–99 (1981) (pointing to interplay between state property
laws and federal constitutional restrictions on the taking of property, and noting that the latter mostly
involve a right to process).
43. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 17 (Dec. 10,
1948) [hereinafter UDHR]; Council of Europe, Protocol to the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocol No. 11, art. 1,
Mar. 20, 1952, E.T.S. No. 009.
44. For an example relevant to the United States context, see PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RSCH.
SERV., IF11151, CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION: ROOT CAUSES AND U.S. POLICY 1 (2021),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/IF11151.pdf (placing economic issues preeminent among root causes of
Central American migration).
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their country of origin.45 Noncitizens, like citizens, use property ownership
as a way to build wealth.
An immigrant’s property does not lose its importance just because they
are deported. Indeed, to the extent they use property to store wealth, their
ability to exercise their property rights may become more important.
Property an immigrant has accumulated in the United States may provide a
critical support if they are deported or someday decide to return to their
country of origin, for instance after earning enough for a major purchase like
housing for their extended family. However, for all intents and purposes,
many immigrants lose their ability to exercise their property rights upon
deportation.
This is exceptionally problematic in the case where the immigrant owns
a home, because detained and deported immigrants routinely face, and are
severely disadvantaged in, the process of home foreclosure. Empirical
research by economists demonstrates a direct connection between
immigration enforcement and increased foreclosure rates.46 The authors of
one 2016 paper, Jacob Rugh and Matthew Hall, used county 287(g)
agreements with ICE—which are designed to facilitate immigration
enforcement—as a proxy for higher enforcement rates in those counties, and
asked whether they affected rates of home foreclosure.47 The authors found
that rates of foreclosures among Latinos were significantly higher in counties
with 287(g) agreements than in counties without such agreements.48 The
authors even found that counties where immigrant community members were
detained at high rates experienced a more pronounced increase in
foreclosures.49
The data substantiated the authors’ hypothesis that
“deportations exacerbate rates of foreclosure among Latinos by removing
income earners from owner-occupied households.”50
As the study authors note, this dramatic finding is consistent with prior
studies that investigate causal links between immigration enforcement and
foreclosure.51 For instance, one small study followed eight families who
45. See generally, e.g., Alma Vega & Karen Hirschman, The Reasons Older Immigrants in the
United States of America Report for Returning to Mexico, 39 AGEING & SOC’Y 722 (2019).
46. Jacob S. Rugh & Matthew Hall, Deporting the American Dream: Immigration Enforcement
and Latino Foreclosures, 3 SOCIO. SCI. 1053, 1053 (2016).
47. Id. at 1054–56.
48. Id. at 1062–65.
49. Id. at 1066.
50. Id. at 1053.
51. See RANDY CAPPS ET AL., URB. INST. & MIGRATION POL’Y INST., IMPLICATIONS OF
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT ACTIVITIES FOR THE WELL-BEING OF CHILDREN IN IMMIGRANT
FAMILIES
1
(2015),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/alfresco/publicationexhibits/2000405/2000405-Implications-of-Immigration-Enforcement-Activities-for-the-WellBeing-of-Children-in-Immigrant-Families.pdf; HEATHER KOBALL ET AL., URB. INST. &
MIGRATION POL’Y INST., HEALTH AND SOCIAL SERVICE NEEDS OF US-CITIZEN CHILDREN WITH
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owned homes at the time a family member was deported.52 All of these
families had mortgages on their homes, and all of them “struggled to make
mortgage payments in the aftermath of the arrest, because of the loss of the
main breadwinners’ income.”53 Within one year, half of the families had lost
their homes.54
Quantitative data does not exist at the national level for the extent of
these harms, but there is reason to think they are widespread. Thirty percent
of undocumented immigrants, or 3.4 million people, own a home in the
United States,55 and because at least some undocumented people are legally
able to access mortgages56—to say nothing of lawful permanent residents,
who can easily take out mortgages using their social security number and
green card57—the number of people potentially subject to foreclosure of their
home if they are deported is extremely large.
For all families, regardless of citizenship, foreclosure has two severe
consequences. First, it can cause a family to lose its accumulated life savings,
since many families regardless of immigration status use their home as their

DETAINED
OR
DEPORTED
IMMIGRANT
PARENTS
9
(2015),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/71131/2000405-Health-and-Social-ServiceNeeds-of-US-Citizen-Children-with-Detained-or-Deported-Immigrant-Parents.pdf;
AJAY
CHAUDRY ET AL., URB. INST., FACING OUR FUTURE: CHILDREN IN THE AFTERMATH OF
IMMIGRATION
ENFORCEMENT
30–31
(2010),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/28331/412020-Facing-Our-Future.PDF;
Kalina Brabeck & Qingwen Xu, The Impact of Detention and Deportation on Latino Immigrant
Children and Families: A Quantitative Exploration, 32 HISP. J. BEHAV. SCIS. 341, 353–54 (2010).
52. CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 30–31.
53. Id. at 31.
54. Id.
55. Vivian Yee, Kenan Davis & Jugal K. Patel, Here’s the Reality About Illegal Immigrants in
the
United
States,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
6,
2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/03/06/us/politics/undocumented-illegalimmigrants.html.
56. See Shayak Sarkar, Financial Immigration Federalism, 107 GEO. L.J. 1561, 1578–80
(2019) (delineating pathways to a mortgage for some undocumented home buyers); see also Jana
Kasperkevic, The American Dream: How Undocumented Immigrants Buy Homes in the U.S.,
MARKETPLACE (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.marketplace.org/2017/09/11/american-dream-howundocumented-immigrants-buy-homes-us. Furthermore, federal nondiscrimination laws may bar
lenders from discriminating against mortgage-seekers on the basis of alienage. See Perez v. Wells
Fargo & Co., No. 17-cv-00454-MMC, 2017 WL 3314797, at *6–7 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 3, 2017)
(refusing to dismiss claim for alienage discrimination under federal antidiscrimination Equal Credit
Opportunity Act).
57. See Daniel Kurt, Getting a Mortgage for Non-U.S. Citizens, INVESTOPEDIA (June 20, 2021),
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/personal-finance/050115/getting-mortgage-non-uscitizens.asp.
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major savings vehicle.58 Second, foreclosure can lead to housing instability
and a variety of related problems, like child custody issues.59
Yet for deported immigrants and immigrants in removal proceedings,
foreclosure is difficult to avert because their economic situation during and
after deportation makes them particularly vulnerable. A bit of background is
helpful to understand why. Foreclosures typically occur when an individual
uses a mortgage to help them pay for a house, and then stops making monthly
payments on their mortgage for whatever reason.60 Often, sometime after the
buyer stops making payments, the mortgage lender will step in and take legal
possession of the property (the actual “foreclosure” process) in anticipation
of selling it and “getting its money back.”61 Unless the home buyer
successfully argues against the sale in court or catches up on their payment
obligations beforehand, the home goes to an involuntary sale, often at a
severely depressed price.62 If the foreclosure plays out this way, as it often
does, the former owner may receive none of the value they had previously
stored in their home when they made a down payment and previous mortgage
payments.63
Detained and deported immigrants are at a particular disadvantage in
this process.64 For one thing, a detained or deported immigrant will not be
58. There is both a broad public perception and some empirical evidence that owning a home
is one of the best ways for low- and middle-income people to accumulate wealth, though this
consensus has been challenged since the subprime mortgage crisis. See, e.g., Laurie S. Goodman
& Christopher Mayer, Homeownership and the American Dream, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 31, 43, 47,
50 (2018); CHRISTOPHER E. HERBERT & ERIC S. BELSKY, THE HOMEOWNERSHIP EXPERIENCE OF
LOW-INCOME AND MINORITY FAMILIES: A REVIEW AND SYNTHESIS OF THE LITERATURE 4–5
(2006), https://www.huduser.gov/portal/Publications/PDF/hisp_homeown9.pdf.
59. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 30–31.
60. Any number of life events that reduce a household’s income—including the loss of a job or
a serious illness—could lead the household to stop paying its mortgage, as could the realization that
the home is worth less than the cost of the debt. See, e.g., Kristopher Gerardi et al., Can’t Pay or
Won’t Pay? Unemployment, Negative Equity, and Strategic Default 3, 6 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ.
Rsch., Working Paper No. 21630, 2015) (noting “strategic default[s]” among reasons to stop paying
a mortgage, alongside adverse life events traditionally associated with foreclosure).
61. For a clear description of the two kinds of foreclosure processes employed in different
states, see G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, URB. INST., THE IMPACTS OF
FORECLOSURES
ON
FAMILIES
AND
COMMUNITIES
7–8
(2009),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/30426/411909-The-Impacts-of-Foreclosureson-Families-and-Communities.PDF.
62. Id. at 8.
63. This occurs if the homeowner reaches the end of the foreclosure process without selling the
home or reaching an agreement with the lender. On the other hand, it is possible and even common
to sell a mortgaged home before foreclosure ends (or even begins), and even to extract some profit
from the sale. See Daniel Bortz, Can I Sell My Home If I’m Behind on My Mortgage?,
REALTOR.COM (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.realtor.com/advice/sell/can-i-sell-my-home-whenbehind-on-a-mortgage. However, for reasons explained below, this is significantly more difficult
for a detained or deported immigrant to accomplish.
64. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 31.
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able to defend themself in a foreclosure proceeding that requires their
physical presence in court. For another, an immigrant who is detained often
cannot earn an income for many months.65 Similarly, an immigrant who is
deported will in the vast majority of cases find it very difficult to replace their
dollar-denominated income and keep up with their monthly mortgage
payments,66 even if they find immediate employment, which is far from a
given. This is why a family member’s deportation often has a dramatic effect
on a family’s income: A family can lose approximately 70% of its income in
the six months after a family member is deported.67 In turn, a precipitous
drop in household income is often the immediate precursor of a foreclosure,
regardless of a family’s immigration status. As I discuss in a moment, this
economic problem has a direct link to state laws because states set many of
the terms of the foreclosure process.
Despite empirical evidence that foreclosure is a clear and serious threat
to immigrants and their families, states have not reformed their foreclosure
laws to account for the severe impediments that deportation creates. Many
protections for homeowners that are popular with policymakers, like
requiring lenders and homeowners to go before a judge,68 have little utility
where the homeowner is detained or deported. Accomplishing a home sale
from overseas requires specialized knowledge and access to resources, as
well as trustworthy and savvy contacts in the United States. Unfortunately,
many deported immigrants do not have the knowledge, contacts, and
arrangements they need to accomplish this type of sale within the time state
foreclosure laws permit.69
65. In December 2019, the average immigrant was held in immigration detention for fifty-five
days after being charged with removability by ICE. See Immigration Detention in the United States
by
Agency,
A M.
IMMIGR.
COUNCIL
4
(2020),
https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/sites/default/files/research/immigration_detention_i
n_the_united_states_by_agency.pdf. This average of nearly two months in detention represented a
significant increase over the norm earlier in 2019. See Isabela Dias, ICE Is Detaining More People
than Ever—And for Longer, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 1, 2019), https://psmag.com/news/ice-isdetaining-more-people-than-ever-and-for-longer. Yet as the American Immigration Council notes
in its report, the fifty-five-day figure is significantly distorted by the large number of detained
immigrants who choose not to fight their deportation cases. See Immigration Detention in the
United States by Agency, supra. These also generally tend to be immigrants with fewer ties to the
United States. The report notes that noncitizens who sought relief from removal in California
wound up spending an average of 421 days in immigration detention. Id.
66. See CHAUDRY ET AL., supra note 51, at 30–31.
67. See id. at 28–29.
68. See Brian D. Feinstein, State Foreclosure Law: A Neglected Element of the Housing
Finance Debate, 6 PENN WHARTON PUB. POL’Y INITIATIVE 2 (2018),
https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1062&context=pennwhartonppi.
69. For Americans who seamlessly cross borders with just a passport and conduct meetings by
laptop, the idea that leaving the United States can make it difficult to accomplish a home sale may
seem implausible. However, attorneys working with detained and deported clients consistently
report serious difficulties in contacting their clients after they have been removed from the United
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States have the power to build in protections from foreclosure for
immigrants. The states traditionally control foreclosure laws and property
laws, and state laws currently govern most aspects of foreclosure.70 A fix for
this issue could take a number of forms. Indeed, there are already legislative
models at the federal level that provide foreclosure carve-outs for specific
groups, including veterans.71 States might follow the example of this
legislation and create a longer forbearance period for families whose primary
income earner has been deported. States might also require mortgage lenders
to renegotiate repayment terms until an immigrant has an opportunity for
resale. A family might be able to continue making mortgage payments at the
lower rate while they wait for a sale to go through.
Changes to foreclosure statutes are one powerful option. But states
could also implement affirmative programs that facilitate repayment and
resale and that would not require changes to statutory foreclosure law. A
state or locality could create an emergency fund to temporarily assist
deported immigrants and their families through loans.72 It could establish
partnerships with local, state, and regional governments in common countries
of origin to help immigrants convey power of attorney to friends and relatives

States, and even U.S. family members may lose track of deported relatives for long periods of time.
For a snapshot of this phenomenon in the context of detention prior to deportation, see Masha
Gessen, The Bureaucratic Nightmare of Fighting Deportation, NEW YORKER (Apr. 4, 2018),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-bureaucratic-nightmare-of-fighting-deportation.
Given the difficulties inherent in accomplishing a sale after a person has been deported, immigration
lawyers may advise immigrants to give a friend or relative a power of attorney (“POA”) that will
allow them to execute a sale on a home. Immigrants who fail to create a POA before they are
detained may have no options later.
70. At least one legal scholar studying foreclosure has recommended that housing advocates
focus on changes to state-level foreclosure laws—and particularly to foreclosure procedures—as
the federal government increasingly deregulates the lending industry. See Feinstein, supra note 68,
at 1.
71. Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. § 3953.
72. Some states already have (or have previously had) general mortgage help programs of this
nature that do not specifically target the immigrant community—for instance, programs that help
the unemployed with mortgage payments. See, e.g., Homeowners’ Emergency Mortgage Assistance
Program/ACT 91, PA. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, https://www.phfa.org/counseling/hemap.aspx (last
visited Sept. 19, 2021). In some cases, states have administered these general mortgage help
programs using federal funds. See, e.g., Marshall A. Latimore, HomeSafe Georgia’s Free Mortgage
Assistance Program Closing March 2020, ATLANTA VOICE (Jan. 7, 2020),
https://www.theatlantavoice.com/articles/homesafe-georgias-free-mortgage-assistance-programclosing-march-2020. Some states and localities have also invested significant funds in other
services that specifically assist immigrant families, like deportation defense. See, e.g., Nicole
Narea, New York Gave Every Detained Immigrant a Lawyer. It Could Serve as a National Model.,
VOX (June 9, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/22463009/biden-newyork-immigrant-access-lawyer-court; Katy Murphy, California Budget Deal Includes Deportation
Defense Funds for Undocumented Immigrants, MERCURY NEWS (June 17, 2017),
https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/06/16/california-budget-deal-includes-deportation-defensefor-undocumented-immigrants/.
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who can help them sell a home or access the U.S. real estate market through
a reliable broker.73
Making these legislative and non-legislative changes would benefit
states and localities. Foreclosure has a series of broader, community-wide
effects, and Rugh and Hall’s research demonstrates that deportations are a
significant cause of foreclosure in some communities.74 Widespread
foreclosures can damage housing prices and fray community fabrics.75 For
immigrants and the places where they live, this effect may be particularly
pronounced, because new immigrants tend to congregate in neighborhoods
where they already have family and community ties due to network effects.76
Certainly, from an economic and not only a moral perspective, state and local
governments with large immigrant populations have a very strong interest in
seeking to avoid foreclosure.
B. Proof of Identity: Due Process in State Identification Laws and
Reintegration in the Country of Origin
State laws and policies do not just create challenges for immigrants who
still have parts of their lives in the United States. In some cases, they can
even create issues for former immigrants in their country of origin as they try
to reintegrate and rebuild their lives—even if they retain no significant U.S.
ties.77 Problems with state-issued identity documents, another area where
73. Though federal foreign policy preemption places some obvious constraints on the ability of
states and localities to cooperate directly with foreign governments, examples of such collaboration
exist—for instance, between U.S. and Mexican border states and between border mayors. See
Naveena Sadasivam, Despite Trump, Water Agency Fosters Cross-Border Cooperation Between
U.S. and Mexico, TEX. OBSERVER (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.texasobserver.org/water-mexicounited-states-share; US-Mexico Border Mayors Convene Amid High-Stakes Debates, VOICE OF
AMERICA (July 27, 2017, 6:44 PM), https://www.voanews.com/a/united-states-mexico-bordermayors-convene/3962024.html.
74. Consistent with this, Rugh and Hall found that foreclosure rates were higher for whites
living in areas with low segregation between Latinos and whites, suggesting that foreclosure has
broad, indirect effects. See Rugh & Hall, supra note 46, at 1065.
75. The scholarly consensus is that foreclosures hurt neighborhood property values, though
economists disagree on the strength of the effect. See, e.g., Zhenguo Lin, Eric Rosenblatt & Vincent
W. Yao, Spillover Effects of Foreclosures on Neighborhood Property Values, 38 J. REAL EST. FIN.
& ECON. 387, 403–05 (2009).
76. Existing immigrant communities in immigrant-receiving countries exert powerful network
effects, so that new migrants are often drawn to live near expatriates from the same country by
family, language, employment, and cultural ties. See Alejandro Portes & Steven Shafer, Revisiting
the Enclave Hypothesis: Miami Twenty-Five Years Later, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF
ENTREPRENEURSHIP 157, 168–69, 187–88 (Martin Ruef & Michael Lounsbury eds., 2007). For a
general overview that includes the early scholarship in this area, see Maritsa Poros, Migrant Social
Networks: Vehicles for Migration, Integration, and Development, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (Mar.
30, 2011), https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/migrant-social-networks-vehicles-migrationintegration-and-development.
77. See supra notes 31–38 and accompanying text.
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states have great autonomy, can create serious problems for reintegration.78
Together with a lack of national documents from the country of origin, state
laws and policies on identity documents may hinder former U.S. immigrants
trying to take the most basic steps for resettlement, like registering for school
and health care, in their first few weeks in their country of origin and in years
to come.79
While some U.S. states have progressive identification laws that provide
even undocumented residents with identification,80 others have created grave
hurdles for proving identity, residence, school attendance, and other
important basic facts about an individual’s life.81 A lack of basic proof of
78. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1978) (observing historical
state discretion to issue licenses to drivers). The REAL ID Act, which mandated numerous security
requirements for state identification as well as demanding that ID holders be citizens, may seem to
cut against this point. However, REAL ID actually orders federal agencies not to accept state
identification that does not meet certain requirements and sets up a process by which the Secretary
of Homeland Security can certify whether a state is in compliance. See REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub.
L. 109–13, § 202(a)(1)–(2), 119 Stat. 302, 312. While this obviously provides incentives to states
to make some form of REAL ID-compliant identification available to citizens, many states and
localities continue to issue non-REAL ID compliant forms of identification, including some that are
expressly intended to help undocumented people. See, e.g., AB 60 Driver’s Licenses, STATE OF
CAL. DEP’T OF MOTOR VEHICLES, https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/driver-licenses-identificationcards/assembly-bill-ab-60-driver-licenses (last visited Aug. 4, 2020); IDNYC, NYC.GOV,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/idnyc/index.page (last visited Aug. 4, 2020); KATE M. MANUEL &
MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R43452, UNLAWFULLY PRESENT ALIENS, DRIVER’S
LICENSES, AND OTHER STATE-ISSUED ID: SELECT LEGAL ISSUES 1–2 (2014),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43452.pdf.
79. Dominguez-Villegas, supra note 39.
80. See supra note 78. As of now, at least fifteen states plus the District of Columbia allow
some undocumented residents to apply for a driver’s license, and a number of cities, among them
Oakland and New York, issue municipal ID cards to residents regardless of their immigration status.
See States Offering Driver’s Licenses to Immigrants, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES (Aug.
9,
2021),
https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/states-offering-driver-s-licenses-toimmigrants.aspx.
81. The most restrictive policies have faced due process and equal protection challenges in
court and have been repealed, suggesting that the Federal Constitution places a floor on restrictionist
citizenship federalism’s ability to exclude immigrants from the circle of concern. See, e.g., Erik De
La Garza, Texas Cuts a Deal with Kids of Immigrants, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 27, 2016),
https://www.courthousenews.com/texas-cuts-a-deal-with-kids-of-immigrants/. Perhaps the most
shocking recent example of this phenomenon was Texas’s policy, now defunct, to refuse to issue
birth certificates to the U.S.-born children of any parent presenting as documentation only a
matricula consular—a common form of identification issued by Mexican and Central American
consular authorities to their citizens living abroad without lawful status. See Cathy Liu, Note, An
Assault on the Fundamental Right to Parenthood and Birthright Citizenship: An Equal Protection
Analysis of the Recent Ban of the Matricula Consular in Texas’s Birth Certificate Application Policy,
50 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 619, 620–22 (2017). Hundreds of families—at the least—were not
able to secure proof of their U.S. citizen children’s births as a result. Maya Kaufman, Illegal
Immigrants Sue Texas for Denying Birth Certificates to U.S.-Born Children, CBS NEWS (July 24,
2015, 8:38 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/illegal-immigrants-denied-birth-certificates-foru-s-born-children. As an author to the Texas law noted, most states with large immigrant
populations are less restrictive in accepting identification for birth certificates, although they still
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identity and other documentation can lead to shocking problems for former
immigrants, both deportees and voluntary returnees, years after they leave
the United States. One young returnee to Mexico was unable to enroll in
college for five years because she could not get apostilles—a type of formal
seal contemplated by the Hague Convention—for her academic transcript
from her Georgia high school.82 Though the example might sound extreme,
the apostille requirement was until just a few years ago a lawful reason to
deny U.S.-born or -educated children admission to Mexican schools.83
Similarly, until five years ago, the country also required apostilles and
certified Spanish translations for other foreign public documents, including
U.S. birth certificates, that made it difficult for former immigrant parents to
register their former immigrant or U.S. citizen children for social and health
services.84 While these requirements have formally been terminated in
Mexico, in some locales they are still applied and used to turn children away
from education and medical care.85
In Mexico, which has perhaps the largest and best-organized population
of former U.S. immigrants, advocacy groups mounted a sustained campaign
that ultimately pushed the Mexican Congress and federal agencies to address
identification-related problems.86 Mexico’s Instituto Nacional de Migración
differ in how flexible they are. See Liu, supra, at 657–58; see also Arizona Bill Would Deny
Citizenship to Children of Illegal Immigrants, CNN (June 16, 2010, 12:09 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2010/US/06/15/arizona.immigration.children/index.html (chronicling earlier
attempt to pass a similar birth certificate law in Arizona, which ultimately failed).
82. Caitlin Donohue, At Poch@ House, Mexican Deportees and Returnees Find Help Starting
Over, REMEZCLA (Mar. 23, 2018), https://remezcla.com/features/culture/mexico-city-pocho-housedeportees-returnees; see also CARLOS A. GARRIDO DE LA CALLEJA & JILL ANDERSON,
SANTUARIOS EDUCATIVOS EN MÉXICO? PROYECTOS Y PROPUESTAS ANTE LA CRIMINALIZACIÓN
DE JÓVENES DREAMERS RETORNADOS Y DEPORTADOS 72–73 (2018) (discussing documentation
problems faced by Mexican and Mexican American expatriates, deportees, and returnees as they
enroll in school in Mexico).
83. See CALDWELL, supra note 6, at 87 (describing delays to one young woman’s school
enrollment caused by state records and apostille process); Jill Anderson, Bilingual, Bicultural, Not
Yet Binational: Undocumented Immigrant Youth in Mexico and the United States 14, 25 (Wilson
Ctr.
Mex.
Inst.,
Working
Paper,
2016),
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/media/documents/publication/bilingual_bicultural
_not_yet_binational_undocumented_immigrant_youth_in_mexico_and_the_united_states.pdf
(describing apostille requirement as condition for school enrollment).
84. Pamela L. Cruz, A Vulnerable Population: U.S. Citizen Minors Living in Mexico, RICE
UNIV.’S
BAKER
INST.
FOR
PUB.
POL’Y
3
(Mar.
19,
2018),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/research-document/3869bc0a/bi-brief-031918-mexcitizenminors.pdf.
85. Anderson, supra note 83, at 25. The reasons for these phenomena are complex. In Calleja
and Anderson’s telling, discrimination against returned migrants – especially bicultural young
migrants with a deep affinity for the United States – and the rigidity of Mexico’s education system
both play a role in the exclusions they document. See CALLEJA & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 8–
9.
86. See CALLEJA & ANDERSON, supra note 82, at 43 (discussing success of Mexican campaign
to eliminate documentation requirements for some students). By a conservative estimate, over 8.25
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(National Migration Institute) issues constancias de repatriación, or
certificates of repatriation, that are supposed to serve as temporary
identification to recently deported Mexican citizens who pass through its
reception centers.87 In 2017, the Mexican Congress passed changes to
Mexico’s General Law on Education that also helped to ease some
identification-related issues for Mexican and U.S. citizen children of former
U.S. immigrants seeking to register for school.88 The country also developed
a partnership with the federal government of the United States to facilitate
the authentication of birth certificates.89 The passage of these laws improved
(though did not end) the problems posed by state identification laws in
Mexico.
However, the unusually well-documented example of Mexico illustrates
a broader point. In countries that have not taken actions as comprehensive
as Mexico’s—that is, most of them90—identification and birth certificate
laws can gravely and arbitrarily complicate the reintegration of former U.S.
immigrants and their children if they lack U.S. proof of identity and other
biographical data. Before Mexico passed changes to its education law, some
former U.S. immigrants or their children waited years to be able to enroll in
school; one nonprofit, Instituto para las Mujeres en la Migración (“IMUMI”),

million emigrants from Mexico, many of whom are still Mexican citizens, were living in the United
States as of 2010. See OECD, LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 2010, at 237–38 (2009).
One estimate of global migration flows found that approximately 1.3 million Mexican nationals had
returned from the United States to Mexico over a five-year period from 2010 to 2015, as a result of
both return migration and removals by DHS. See Jonathan J. Azose & Adrian E. Raftery, Estimation
of Emigration, Return Migration, and Transit Migration Between All Pairs of Countries, 116 PNAS
116, 118–19 (2019). Given the tremendous size of the expatriate population in the United States,
the country’s policymakers have long grappled with facilitating reintegration for returnees from this
country, and multiple government agencies exist to facilitate the process of reintegration. See
Dominguez-Villegas, supra note 39. No other country in the world has such a large population of
its citizens living in the United States.
87. See Dominguez-Villegas, supra note 39.
88. Ley General de Educación, art. 33, Diario Oficial de la Federación [DOF], últimas reformas
DOF 22-03-2017 (Mex.) (protecting the right to access education for students without academic
transcripts or identity documents and rescinding the requirement that these students present birth
certificates or apostilles to register for school); see also Senado Aprueba Reforma a Ley de
Educación que Facilita Revalidación de Estudios a Migrantes, SENADO DE LA REPÚBLICA (Feb.
28, 2017, 6:44 PM), http://comunicacion.senado.gob.mx/index.php/informacion/boletines/34623senado-aprueba-reforma-a-ley-de-educacion-que-facilita-revalidacion-de-estudios-amigrantes.html (announcing passage of the bill reforming Mexico’s education law).
89. Cruz, supra note 84, at 4.
90. Mexico has a longer track record of reintegrating returned migrants than other countries in
the Americas, with its first effort dating back to the 1980s. ARIEL G. RUIZ SOTO ET AL., MIGRATION
POL’Y INST., SUSTAINABLE REINTEGRATION: STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT MIGRANTS RETURNING TO
MEXICO
AND
CENTRAL
AMERICA
13
n.25
(2019),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/MPI-ReceptionReintegrationFinalWeb.pdf.
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has devoted a significant amount of its legal resources to helping parents
obtain needed documentation from both the United States and Mexico.91
Like foreclosure law, identification laws have important constitutional
and fundamental rights valences. In the United States, as in most countries,
identification documents are required to access a broad variety of social
services, including education, welfare, and health benefits. In turn, the
deprivation of these entitlements has been found unconstitutional where it
violates equal protection (in the case of education)92 or due process (in the
case of welfare benefits).93 In other societies, depriving individuals of these
entitlements may be a violation of rights to receive the underlying support—
for example, a violation of the substantive right to education or health care.94
And failing to duly issue proof of identity is a human rights violation, and
may lead to other human rights violations if basic services are withheld.95
Providing individuals with proper identification and biographical
information, then, is essential for vindicating a variety of other rights, no
matter how those rights are defined.
Motivated states could do far more to protect these rights and assist
returned immigrants in rebuilding their lives abroad by facilitating access to
documents. Identification is another area where states have legal and policy
autonomy.96 Many states continue to issue a variety of forms of non-REAL
ID-compliant identification to undocumented immigrants, demonstrating a

91. See id. at 13.
92. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 215, 223–24 (1982) (depriving noncitizen students
of ability to access public schools due to their immigration status violates Equal Protection Clause).
93. See e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332–35, 343 (1976) (finding Social Security
benefits gave rise to a property right and requiring procedural due process protections applied to
benefits terminations); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 266–71 (1970) (finding Due Process
Clause mandated a hearing with procedural protections before welfare benefits were taken away).
Numerous commentators have observed the damaging exclusionary effects that ensue when
noncitizens in the United States do not have access to driver’s licenses or other valid proof of
identity. See, e.g., Gregory A. Odegaard, A Yes or No Answer: A Plea to End the Oversimplification
of the Debate on Licensing Aliens, 24 J.L. & POL. 435, 465 (2008); María Pabón López, More Than
a License to Drive: State Restrictions on the Use of Driver’s Licenses by Noncitizens, 29 S. ILL. U.
L.J. 91, 96–98 (2004).
94. A number of countries provide for social rights that guarantee access to certain types of
entitlements, for instance housing and education, in their constitutions. See Courtney Jung, Ran
Hirschl & Evan Rosevear, Economic and Social Rights in National Constitutions, 62 AM. J.
COMPAR. L. 1043, 1044, 1054 (2014) (surveying prevalence of economic and social rights across
world constitutions).
95. See, e.g., UDHR, supra note 43, art. 6 (codifying right to be recognized as a person by law);
G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 16, Dec. 16, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] (same); id. art. 24, para. 2 (codifying right to the registration
of one’s birth by the state); G.A. Res. 44/25, Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 7, Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (same).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Best, 573 F.2d 1095, 1103 (9th Cir. 1978).
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willingness to provide noncitizens with proof of identity.97 There is nothing
to stop states from working with sending countries to do more. For instance,
they could work with sending countries to develop standards for state IDs
that could serve as identification in their main diaspora communities’
countries of origin; or states could make it easier for students overseas to
secure valid academic transcripts from public schools and state universities.
State governments also have the power to facilitate access to other important
documents, including records from public hospitals and the birth certificates
of U.S. citizen children.98 And they could facilitate changes to documents
like birth certificates and identity cards that are needed to align U.S.
documents that use different spellings of names with paperwork from other
countries. Seemingly small changes in policy or modest new programs could
save some former immigrants years of frustration as they seek to reintegrate
into their countries of origin.
C. Parental Rights: Termination of Parental Rights and the
Deprivation of the Right to Family Relationships
The Trump Administration’s policy of separating families at the border
beginning in 2017 caused a major scandal.99 Observers expressed alarm that
American families could adopt the separated children, terminating their
parents’ rights in the process.100 The outcry over family separation stems
from a deep sense of the inviolability of those relationships that is also
reflected in U.S. law. The right to family relationships has been repeatedly
recognized as a core substantive due process right in decades of Supreme
Court jurisprudence,101 and is also protected under international human rights
law and the law of many individual countries.102
Lost in the emotionally charged debate over new family separation
policies is the fact that our immigration system and our state courts routinely
separate immigrant parents from their children, and have done so for years.
State family courts terminate the parental rights of deported parents with

97. See supra note 78.
98. See RUIZ SOTO ET AL., supra note 90, at 22.
99. See Julie Hirschfeld Davis & Michael D. Shear, How Trump Came to Enforce a Practice
of
Separating
Migrant
Families,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
16,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/06/16/us/politics/family-separation-trump.html.
100. See Kathryn Joyce, The Threat of International Adoption for Migrant Children Separated
from
Their
Families,
INTERCEPT
(July
1,
2018,
9:37
AM),
https://theintercept.com/2018/07/01/separated-children-adoption-immigration.
101. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644, 665–66 (2015); Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S.
246, 255 (1978).
102. See UDHR, supra note 43, art. 16; ICCPR, supra note 95, art. 17, 23.
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some regularity, leaving their children permanently in the custody of a
relative or stranger.103
Termination of parental rights is a necessary predicate to an adoption—
a third party cannot adopt a child so long as the parent still has rights.104
Where a parent does not consent to the adoption, to terminate parental rights,
a state court will find either that (1) termination is in the best interests of the
child or (2) the parent is “unfit”—sometimes both.105 There are a number of
different grounds for termination, and these vary somewhat from state to
state.106 In no state is being deported expressly a ground for termination.
However, existing empirical evidence and state case law suggest that
detention and deportation can easily make a parent “unfit” in some courts—
most often indirectly, because the detention and deportation lead to child
“abandonment” or “neglect.”107
While every state’s system is different, child welfare proceedings can
be initiated within a matter of days of a child coming into state custody.
Detained or deported immigrants without a documented relative or friend to
quickly claim their children may face extraordinary hurdles to maintaining
their parental rights.108 Writing for detained parents trying to remove their
children from the Arizona child welfare system pro se, the Florence
Immigrant and Refugee Rights Project noted the urgency with which these
parents must act: “If CPS [Child Protective Services] has taken your children
on an emergency basis and no one has come forward to care for them within
48 hours . . . . you and your children will become part of a court process
called Dependency that can be very long and complicated, and could end by
terminating your parental rights to your children . . . .”109 Given that many
103. See infra notes 112–113.
104. See Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY 1 (2021), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf.
105. Id. at 2. While states may not constitutionally terminate the parental rights of a fit parent—
making a finding of unfitness theoretically necessary for a termination—an increasing number of
state courts have placed more and more analytic emphasis on the best interests standard, to the
apparent detriment of immigrant parents. Marcia Yablon-Zug, Separation, Deportation,
Termination, 32 B.C. J.L. & SOC. JUST. 63, 66, 72–73 (2012).
106. See Grounds for Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights, supra note 104, at 2.
107. See Yablon-Zug, supra note 105, at 88, 95.
108. Protecting Your Parental Rights: A Resource for Immigrant Detainees with Child Custody
Issues in Arizona, FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. PROJECT (Feb. 2010),
http://www.firrp.org/media/HowToProtectYourParentalRights-en.pdf [hereinafter Protecting Your
Parental Rights]. The Florence Immigration and Refugee Rights Project (“FIRRP”) advises
detained immigrants not to send undocumented relatives or friends to claim their children because
some child welfare agencies, including Arizona’s, refuse to release children to undocumented
people and may even refer them to immigration authorities. Id. at 3–4; see also Guide to Protecting
Your Parental Rights, FLORENCE IMMIGRANT & REFUGEE RTS. PROJECT 4–5 (May 2013),
https://firrp.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/Parental-Rights-Guide-2013.pdf.
109. Protecting Your Parental Rights, supra note 108, at 4.
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detained immigrants are barely able to place calls from immigration
detention, this timeline to locate an alternate caregiver who is documented—
or otherwise willing to claim the children from CPS—is impossibly
compressed.110
A major 2011 study of the immigration and child welfare systems
conservatively estimated that 5,100 children nationally were in foster care (a
predicate to termination of parental rights) due to an immigrant parent’s
detention or deportation, and that another 15,000 would cycle through this
position over the following five years, through 2016.111 While this 2011
report is still the most comprehensive empirical account of the termination
problem, legal scholars have taken note of this problem both before and
since,112 as have journalists.113 With deportations of long-term residents
continuing apace under the Trump Administration, these more recent
anecdotal reports leave no reason to believe this figure has decreased.
Detention and deportation can trigger child custody problems and
subsequently hinder a parent’s efforts to fight termination.114 With a parent
110. See Zachary Manfredi & Joseph Meyers, Isolated and Unreachable: Contesting
Unconstitutional Restrictions on Communication in Immigration Detention, 95 N.Y.U. L. REV. 130,
139–45 (2020) (outlining severe barriers to communication from immigration detention including
isolated location of detention centers, arbitrary transfers of detainees, and cost and low quality of
phone calls).
111. SETH FREED WESSLER, APPLIED RSCH. CTR., SHATTERED FAMILIES: THE PERILOUS
INTERSECTION OF IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 6 (2011).
112. See, e.g., Anita Ortiz Maddali, The Immigrant “Other”: Racialized Identity and the
Devaluation of Immigrant Family Relations, 89 IND. L.J. 643, 645–46 (2014) (identifying role of
deportation in separation of undocumented families through the child welfare system); Stacy Byrd,
Note, Learning from the Past: Why Termination of a Non-Citizen Parent’s Rights Should Not Be
Based on the Child’s Best Interest, 68 U. MIA. L. REV. 323, 323–26 (2013) (same); C. Elizabeth
Hall, Note, Where Are My Children . . . and My Rights? Parental Rights Termination as a
Consequence of Deportation, 60 DUKE L.J. 1459, 1459, 1462–63 (2011) (same); Yablon-Zug, supra
note 105, at 65–66 (same); Nina Rabin, Disappearing Parents: Immigration Enforcement and the
Child Welfare System, 44 CONN. L. REV. 99, 114–15 (2011) (same); S. Adam Ferguson, Note, Not
Without My Daughter: Deportation and the Termination of Parental Rights, 22 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J.
85, 92 (2007) (same). See generally David B. Thronson, Of Borders and Best Interests: Examining
the Experiences of Undocumented Immigrants in U.S. Family Courts, 11 TEX. HISP. J.L. & POL’Y
45 (2005) (assessing, at an early date, how immigration status more generally affects parental rights
in termination proceedings, including how courts assess the threat that an undocumented parent may
be deported).
113. Associated Press, Deported Parents May Lose Kids to Adoption, Investigation Finds, NBC
NEWS (Oct. 9, 2018, 2:59 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/deported-parents-may-losekids-adoption-investigation-finds-n918261. Again, journalists’ reports probably underestimate the
magnitude of the problem, since—as the Associated Press expressly noted in its reporting—many
child custody cases are sealed and thus not searchable.
114. Numerous detention trends are likely to have exacerbated this problem. For instance, in
2011, far fewer immigrants were subject to mandatory immigration detention. Since the Supreme
Court’s decision in Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954 (2019), a vastly larger subset of lawful
permanent residents is now subject to mandatory detention. This means that they are unable to
attend child custody hearings in person or participate in home visits so long as they are fighting their
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detained or deported, a child may be considered neglected or abandoned,
which leads to the child going to foster care if no relative with lawful status
can step in.115 And the conditions child services agencies set for reunification
with the parent can be difficult or impossible to meet from detention or
abroad. Many courts require parents to attend child custody hearings as a
minimum condition of retaining their parental rights—an accommodation
that ICE will not make for parents in detention.116 In other cases, parents
must comply with elaborate case management plans, including completing
home visits that are impossible from detention or the country of removal.117
The cases show how tough it can be to surmount the hurdles to
reunification after deportation. For instance, in In re C.M.,118 the California
Court of Appeals considered whether a Mexican citizen father would retain
parental rights to his two U.S. citizen children. When his children, C.M. and
D.M., were six and three years old, the father was deported to Mexico.119 In
2005, he reentered the United States and found work in the Midwest as a
seasonal farm laborer.120 By returning to the United States after his
deportation, the father had committed the federal crime of unlawful reentry,
which is punishable by a term in prison.121 Eventually, the father was arrested
and incarcerated.122
In the interim, C.M. and D.M.’s mother had died, and through a series
of connections the children had ended up in the care of another, non-related
family.123 Eventually, the foster family decided to adopt the children, and—
cases. The Trump Administration also began systematically denying immigration detainees’ parole,
another avenue immigrants can use to leave detention, despite court challenges. See Miriam Jordan,
Court Blocks Trump Administration from Blanket Detention of Asylum Seekers, N.Y. TIMES (July
2,
2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/02/us/asylum-court-ruling-detention.html.
Meanwhile, conditions in the nation’s expanded immigration prison system make participation by
telephone in child custody hearings impossible for most immigrants; most detainees are barely able
to contact a lawyer. See, e.g., Complaint for Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 4, 9, 11–14, Torres
v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 411 F. Supp. 3d 1036 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (No. EDCV 18-2604 JGB
(SHKx)); see also Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in
Immigration Court, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 34–35 (2015).
115. WESSLER, supra note 111, at 26. Family courts may be further primed to find parental
abandonment and unfitness when evaluating the cases of immigrant children because, so often for
undocumented children, parental abandonment and unfitness are part of an important path to relief
via Special Immigrant Juvenile Status. Id.
116. Id. at 36–37.
117. See, e.g., In re Maria S., 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 655, 656, 659–60 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (mother
could not comply with case plan because she was deported to El Salvador; court found she had not
been given a reasonable opportunity to comply); see also WESSLER, supra note 111, at 38–40, 50.
118. No. G042411, 2010 WL 3048439 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 5, 2010).
119. Id. at *1.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id. at *2.
123. Id.
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as a necessary first step to completing the adoption—petitioned to terminate
the father’s parental rights.124 The father opposed the petition, arguing that
he had never intended to permanently give up his rights to his children.125
In finding that the father had abandoned the children and severing his
rights in favor of the foster family, the family court judge decided to “accept
the testimony of [respondents], simply because I watched them testify; they
seem like nice people; they’re citizens; they work and pay taxes like the rest
of us; and they are not in the joint.”126 The judge contrasted them with the
father, “somebody who is over the border illegally, and having been
convicted as a federal felon.”127
The family court judge appeared particularly skeptical of the immigrant
father’s claims that he attempted to stay in touch with his children.128
However, the judge failed to consider the hardships immigration detainees
face when calling family. Detainees must pay for calls to family out of their
commissary accounts.129
At the time of this case, the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) had not yet implemented reforms to
prison phone providers, and these calls could easily cost about a dollar per
minute.130 The father stated that, by working in detention, he was able to earn
an average of about $18 per month, most of which he spent on calls to his
children.131 Even if the father spent all of his money on calls, this could easily
equate to just 18 minutes of phone time with his children every month.
The family court judge was unsympathetic to the constraints placed on
the father:
[W]here we’re at on this for [father] is that basically he wants to
reserve the right to say to his pals down in Mexico, or wherever he
winds up when they let him out, that “I never gave up my kids. I
didn’t abandon them. I fought down to the wire. That dummy
judge took them away, along with [respondents], those rats. I
fought it all the way and I took a bullet for them.” The problem is,
in the meantime, while they are growing up, he hasn’t bothered to

124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. (alteration in original).
127. Id.
128. Id. at *2–3.
129. Manfredi & Meyers, supra note 110, at 141–42.
130. See Mignon Clyburn, Another Step Toward Fairness in Inmate Calling Services, FCC
(Sept. 30, 2015, 12:45 PM), https://www.fcc.gov/news-events/blog/2015/09/30/another-steptoward-fairness-inmate-calling-services; Drew Kukorowski, The Price to Call Home: StateSanctioned Monopolization in the Prison Phone Industry, PRISON POL’Y INITIATIVE (Sept. 11,
2012), https://www.prisonpolicy.org/phones/report.html.
131. In re C.M., 2010 WL 3048439, at *2.
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support them and his contact with them has been, to say the least,
token.132
A state appellate court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling, upholding his
finding that the father had abandoned the children and citing as evidence his
failure to call or send money for gifts.133 The appellate court found that:
While some of the judge’s comments were rather harsh, we do not
believe they are cause for a reversal. . . . [I]t is clear the judge did
not discredit him because he was an illegal alien, as he maintains.
Rather, the court discredited him because he was convicted of a
federal offense for illegally reentering the country after having
been deported.134
As one commentator has observed, the best interests of the child
standard has, in some cases, become a cover for anti-immigrant bias, and that
is apparently how it was applied here.135 Other courts appear unaware of the
hurdles that face detained and deported parents in caring for their children.136
Few former immigrant parents will find that state laws effectively
protect them from discriminatory termination processes like the one C.M.
and D.M.’s father endured. A handful of state supreme and appellate courts
that have considered the issue have signaled that the termination of parental
rights for reasons of immigration status, detention, or deportation violates the
Due Process Clause.137 Though the results of many of these appeals are
132. Id. at *3 (second and third alterations in original).
133. Id. at *4–5.
134. Id. at *5.
135. Yablon-Zug, supra note 105, at 101–05; see also Ortiz Maddali, supra note 112, at 666.
136. See, e.g., State ex rel. Interest of M.F., No. 20080250–CA, 2008 WL 2224277, at *1–2
(Utah Ct. App. May 30, 2008) (upholding termination of deported father’s parental rights on
grounds that he had not seen his children or provided support in two years); Tenn. Dep’t of Child.’s
Servs. v. Ahmad, No. M2004-02604-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 975339, at *1–3 (Tenn. Ct. App. April
26, 2005) (upholding termination of mother’s rights after deportation); In re M.A.P.A., No. 981218, 1999 WL 711447, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. July 23, 1999) (upholding termination of
undocumented father’s parental rights on grounds that he would likely be deported after his
incarceration ended). For additional examples of such cases, see Yablon-Zug, supra note 105, at
88–90.
137. See, e.g., Adoption of Posy, 119 N.E.3d 747, 752 (Mass. App. Ct. 2019) (reversing
termination of deported Guatemalan father’s parental rights while expressing concern about “the
swiftness with which the [child welfare] department changed its goal from reunification to
adoption” and noting that “the department’s charge to establish permanency for the
children . . . must be met, however, consistent with due process”); In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796,
805, 810 (Tex. 2012) (reversing termination of deported father’s rights, finding that treating any
threat of deportation arising from a criminal act as a grounds for termination would violate the Due
Process Clause); In re B. & J., 756 N.W.2d 234, 239 (Mich. Ct. App. 2008) (reversing termination
of parental rights based on parents’ alleged inability to provide proper care in Guatemala, and noting
that “a state may not, consistent with due process of law, create the conditions that will strip an
individual of an interest protected under the due process clause”) (quoting In re Valerie D., 613
A.2d 748, 770 (Conn. 1992)); In re Interest of Mainor T., 674 N.W.2d 442, 460, 464 (Neb. 2004)
(reversing termination of parental rights of mother deported to Guatemala after finding numerous
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encouraging, the limited existing case law on termination of parental rights
is itself disturbing because the dearth of cases suggests that few former
immigrants are able to litigate a termination case on appeal or otherwise
pursue their claims successfully.138 One Mexican father who was reunited
with his U.S. citizen sons three years after his deportation was only able to
win his case after an extensive public outcry led DHS to temporarily parole
him into the United States to attend his child custody hearings.139 Not every
case receives national attention, and this kind of luck is rare.
As with the foreclosure issue, states have it within their power to protect
the parental rights of detained and deported parents. The law of termination
is almost wholly within state control—indeed, in few areas of law is the
principle of state control so sacrosanct as in family law.140
Nonetheless, virtually the only states to address this problem have done
so through the court rulings mentioned above, not by legislation. As of 2019,
only California and New York have adopted relatively forward-thinking
legislation to aid in reunifying children with deported parents—these states
have allowed judges discretion to give detained or deported parents
extensions, and required them to consider barriers parents might face to
comply with court orders.141 More commonly, state legislatures have
errors by trial court in conduct of case while mother was in immigration detention that vitiated her
due process rights).
138. See Ortiz Maddali, supra note 112, at 645–46.
139. Seth Freed Wessler, Deported Father’s Case Ends as Congress Debates Immigration
Changes, COLORLINES (Feb. 19, 2013, 2:15 PM), https://www.colorlines.com/articles/deportedfathers-case-ends-congress-debates-immigration-changes.
140. The domestic relations exception, which covers family law matters, is among the oldest and
most inflexible exceptions to federal court jurisdiction in U.S. law. See Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(1 How.) 582, 584 (1858); In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593–94 (1890). Asked to consider the issue
again relatively recently, the Supreme Court stated that “state courts are more eminently suited to
work of this type than are federal courts, which lack the close association with state and local
government organizations dedicated to handling issues that arise out of conflicts over divorce,
alimony, and child custody decrees.” Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 704 (1992). Though
federal statutes do exist in the area of termination of parental rights and family law more broadly,
states have wide authority to legislate in these areas without much threat of preemption, although
certain well-defined domains are now also subject to national legislation. See Ann Laquer Estin,
Sharing Governance: Family Law in Congress and the States, 18 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 267,
270–71 (2009).
141. See Ann Park, Keeping Immigrant Families in the Child Protection System Together, AM.
BAR
ASS’N
(Dec.
30,
2020),
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public_interest/
child_law/project-areas/immigration/keeping-immigrant-families-in-the-child-protection-systemtogeth. California’s Reuniting Immigrant Families Act implemented several reforms to the child
welfare and family court system to reduce barriers to reunification, including creating discretion to
give extensions, forbidding courts from considering immigration status when placing children with
family members, and requiring judges to consider barriers detained or deported parents face to
compliance with court orders. S.B. 1064, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012). The New York State
Reuniting Families Act, which was modeled on the California bill, passed and was signed by the
governor in 2019. S.B. 5024A, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019). See also Ann Park, Keeping
Immigrant Families in the Child Protection System Together, CHILD L. PRAC., Apr. 2014, at 49, 50.
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considered protective bills but ultimately dropped them in favor of softer
changes in agency policy; in other cases, state legislatures have elected to do
nothing.142
Compared to other actions within the states’ power, most of these
responses are modest. Because states have broad authority over family
law,143 they have the capacity to protect deported parents’ rights in a robust
and comprehensive way. The path to change is relatively clear: many reforms
that have been proposed to aid incarcerated parents would also help detained
or deported parents.144 States could either permit or require child welfare
agencies or judges to extend permanency deadlines where a parent is detained
or has been deported, as several states do for incarcerated parents.145 They
could bar the consideration of immigration status in child custody

142. See, e.g., S.B. 1303, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ariz. 2013) (provided a six-month extension for
incarcerated immigrant parents in foster care trying to reunify with their children, but did not pass
into law); H.B. 3050, 98th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2013) (closely following model of
California Reuniting Immigrant Families Act, but did not pass into law).
143. An important exception with ramifications for detained and deported parents is the
Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 (“ASFA”), Pub. L. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115, which
significantly intervened in states’ discretion to shape the law of parental termination by shifting the
presumption away from family reunification and giving greater weight to children’s health and
safety and lesser weight to parental rights. See Olivia Golden & Jennifer Ehrle Macomber,
Framework Paper: The Adoption and Safe Families Act (ASFA), in URB. INST., INTENTIONS AND
RESULTS: A LOOK BACK AT THE ADOPTION AND SAFE FAMILIES ACT 5, 7, 11–16 (2009),
https://www.urban.org/research/publication/intentions-and-results-look-back-adoption-and-safefamilies-act/view/full_report; see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in
Adoption, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-toapprove-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html. Though ASFA was designed to reduce the focus on
family reunification, states that have wanted to continue to prioritize parental rights and
reunification in their family law have relied on exceptions contained in AFSA to avoid the law’s
stricter rules and timelines for the termination of parental rights. See Katherine A. Hort, Note, Is
Twenty-Two Months Beyond the Best Interest of the Child? ASFA’s Guidelines for the Termination
of Parental Rights, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1879, 1881–82 (2001). Ultimately, given the strategies
states have developed to give themselves flexibility under ASFA, its intervention in state family
law should place relatively few barriers on efforts to keep separated immigrant families together.
144. Advocates have observed parallels between the termination of incarcerated parents’ rights
and family separation, and indeed incarcerated parents and detained or deported parents tend to lose
their rights to their children for very similar reasons. See Eli Hager & Anna Flagg, How
Incarcerated Parents Are Losing Their Children Forever, MARSHALL PROJECT (Dec. 2, 2018,
10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/12/03/how-incarcerated-parents-are-losingtheir-children-forever.
145. Several states have laws that give agencies or family courts discretion to extend the fifteenmonth timeline for termination of parental rights, though they do not require them to do so. See
Cal. S.B. 1064; N.Y. S.B. 5024A; WESSLER, supra note 111, at 41; see also Alison Walsh, States,
Help Families Stay Together by Correcting a Consequence of the Adoption and Safe Families Act,
PRISON
POL’Y
INITIATIVE
(May
24,
2016),
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/blog/2016/05/24/asfa/#:~:text=New%20York%20passed%20the%2
0ASFA,a%20residential%20drug%20treatment%20program.
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proceedings, as California and New York have done by statute and a few
other states have done by judicially created rulings.146
And, of course, in addition to changing the legal standards, states could
reform their child welfare departments and retrain staff so that deported
parents—particularly those from common migrant-sending countries—have
a better chance to comply with case management plans and ultimately retain
their rights.147 States could expand their cooperation with consular officials
from countries that are heavily represented in the state’s immigrant
population, helping to facilitate family reunification after deportation.148
Expanded use of televideo check-ins and home visits and cooperation with
in-country child welfare officials would help at least some parents with
relatively robust access to resources comply with case management plans.
All of these reforms could reduce the number of families that are permanently
separated like C.M. and D.M.’s.
II. CITIZENSHIP FEDERALISM: HOW STATES CAN REDEFINE THE SUBJECTS
OF RIGHTS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
As Part I of this Article shows, states exercise a huge amount of power
to shape the lives of a large and growing group of noncitizens outside of the
United States. Through laws and policies, they control former immigrants’
substantive outcomes in many areas of life long after their deportation. Yet
few states, even states that have shown themselves in recent years to be
deeply committed to progressive federalism and expressive challenges to
Executive Branch immigration policies, have pursued policies or laws to aid
this group. Indeed, perhaps they are unaware that they can. This Part of the
Article offers a theory of why states have failed to make policy on the issues
detailed in Part I, as well as others outside the scope of this Article.
States have not overlooked the problems in Part I out of a lack of interest
or will. As the following Section will explain, more states are doing
immigration federalism than ever before, targeting an expanding set of issues,
and advocates and scholars have consistently called on them to do still
more.149 Instead, this Article argues, states have not entered the arenas
146. See supra note 137. The issue of whether family court judges should be able to consider
immigration status in termination proceedings is particularly ripe for litigation because of the
serious constitutional questions it raises.
147. Without adequate training on the intersection of child welfare and immigration and the
flexibility to tailor plans, case workers often produce intensely inappropriate case management
plans that require home visits, counseling, supervised time with children, and other steps that are
physically impossible for a detained or deported parent to comply with. See WESSLER, supra note
111, at 38.
148. See id. at 58.
149. See, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 11, at 904–15 (calling on states to grant citizenship to
undocumented immigrants as a way to confer valuable benefits, foster integration, and set

2022]

CITIZENSHIP FEDERALISM

533

described in Part I because they unthinkingly hew to the federal model for
determining the boundaries of our circle of concern, a model that is primarily
territorial.150 Because states have reacted to the federal paradigm and to
federal law rather than stepping back to ask broader questions about how they
want to define political and social membership, they have suffered up until
now from a fundamental failure to reorient and depart from this paradigm.
But as Part I demonstrates, states have a power that they fail to exercise:
treating former immigrants as worthy of consideration by removing
impediments to their wellbeing and livelihood. If states began to exercise
this power, then gradually they might test and adopt a different model for the
boundaries of our community than the federal government, using the welldocumented capacity, in a federalist system, to change policies and values at
the national level from the bottom up.151 Just as other nationwide campaigns,
like the struggle for marriage equality, relied on grassroots advocacy and
local changes in law to create dialogue around deeply held norms, immigrant
rights advocates can use calls for local change to open space for
transformative shifts in national values around membership and inclusion.152
Section II.A offers a theory of why states have reactively adopted the
territorial paradigm for noncitizen rights rather than engaging in citizenship
federalism. Section II.B briefly outlines the promise of citizenship
federalism for activists and policymakers, and discusses why this Article’s
approach to rethinking state immigration lawmaking may be of interest to a
broad group of scholars who deal with both migration and federalism.

alternative boundaries for the political community). The fullest academic reimagining of how states
and localities draw the boundaries of the community of rights-holders has come in the area of
noncitizen voting, which some states allowed even in presidential elections until the early twentieth
century, but which today is rare. See Raskin, supra note 12, at 1393; see also Kimia Pakdaman,
Noncitizen Voting Rights in the United States, BERKELEY PUB. POL’Y J., Spring 2019, at 33
(summarizing jurisdictions allowing noncitizen voting). Noncitizen voting, its possibilities, and the
values that underlie it have received sustained scholarly treatment from legal scholars, citizenship
theorists, and political scientists in the past. See, e.g., supra note 12.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 15–16.
151. See Markowitz, supra note 11, at 914; Heather Gerken, Windsor’s Mad Genius: The
Interlocking Gears of Rights and Structure, 95 B.U. L. REV. 587, 594–97 (2015). As Gerken
observed in 2015, the discursive interplay between local change and national debate that she
identifies applies just as clearly to immigrant rights: “My focus here is the same-sex marriage
debate, but you can play this game with almost any topic. What moved immigration to the front
page in recent years? Arizona’s anti-immigration initiatives.” Gerken, supra, at 597.
152. See Gerken, supra note 151, at 597.
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A. Immigration Federalism: Reacting to the Federal Government,
Replicating a Paradigm
Though the scholarship on “immigration federalism” originally started
with a narrow definition,153 recent scholarship has defined “immigration
federalism” broadly, using the term to refer to all state lawmaking affecting
immigrants and immigration, whether pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant.154
While this definition is vast, an examination of both past lawmaking and
the scholarly literature reveals that immigration federalism in practice has
limits. Generally speaking, and as discussed in more detail below,
immigration federalism has asked what rights should be extended to the
group of noncitizens the federal government has already identified as within
the circle of concern—that is, the group on state territory. Citizenship
federalism, the paradigm I propose, asks (and can answer) an antecedent
question: What values should define who is within the circle of concern in
the first instance, and should territory be paramount among them?155 I do not
mean to suggest that immigration federalism has not tested values around
inclusion. Certainly, deciding whether and how much to protect noncitizens
living in the states raises important questions about the scope of community.
Yet as much as it has sought to amend federal law and blunt or sharpen the
effects of federal policy, most immigration federalism, even in its progressive
forms, has not challenged the deep territorial bias that pervades our
constitutional law of immigration, alienage discrimination, and membership.
The practice of demanding and enacting, in policy and in law, changes to the
boundary of the circle of concern—which the reforms discussed briefly in
Part I would exemplify—is what I mean by citizenship federalism.
If most states have not challenged the federal model, it is not out of a
lack of interest in legislating on immigration. State immigration law has
vastly expanded over the past two decades, driven equally by immigrant
integrationist and immigrant restrictionist impulses.156 In 2017, forty-nine
153. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 14, at 509–10 (defining immigration federalism in terms of
state attempts to discriminate against immigrants).
154. See supra note 11.
155. The scholarship on noncitizen voting and state citizenship is an exception because it seeks
to challenge criteria for political inclusion; it thus can be thought of as an antecedent of the broader
concept of citizenship federalism. See supra note 12.
156. Perhaps the two most infamous pieces of state immigration lawmaking, Arizona S.B. 1070
and California Proposition 187, were anti-immigrant in intent. The Arizona legislation dealt with
collaboration on immigration enforcement, while the California ballot initiative sought to deny
immigrants access to a wide variety of critical state benefits including public schooling and health
care. Arizona SB 1070, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Arizona_SB_1070 (last visited Jan.
2, 2022); California Proposition 187, Prohibit Undocumented Immigrants from Using Public
Healthcare,
Schools,
and
Social
Services
Initiative
(1994),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/California_Proposition_187,_Prohibit_Undocumented_Immigrants_from_
Using_Public_Healthcare,_Schools,_and_Social_Services_Initiative_(1994) (last visited Jan. 2,
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states and the District of Columbia passed at least one law relating to
immigration enforcement or access to entitlements like state Medicaid; back
in 2005, the figure stood at twenty-five states.157 Today, examples abound of
both dramatic inclusionary measures providing access to higher education,
health care, and disaster relief and aggressive restrictionist laws seeking to
make it virtually impossible for immigrants to live in a given place.158
However, a closer examination of the immigration federalism that states
have engaged in demonstrates how thoroughly states have allowed the federal
government to set the terms of the debate. On inspection, immigration
federalism’s effects are not pervasive throughout all areas of state law. The
existing academic literature on immigration federalism reveals that most
legislative activity falls into one of two categories: measures that promote or
impede immigration enforcement159 and measures that provide or restrict
access to social services or entitlements like health care or funding for higher
education.160
There are exceptions—scholars have also considered
antidiscrimination laws and noncitizen voting.161 However, the former type
2022); see also Randal C. Archibold, Arizona Enacts Stringent Law on Immigration, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 24, 2010, at A1.
157. States do not regulate immigration directly, and what one considers a “state immigration
bill” is partly a matter of perspective. The National Conference of State Legislatures’ relatively
broad definition includes bills with some effect on immigrants’ or noncitizens’ rights or benefits in
ten general categories: budget, education, employment, health, human trafficking, IDs and drivers’
licenses, law enforcement, public benefits, and a “[m]iscellaneous” category that in 2017 included
bills authorizing the study of refugee populations and advancing Muslim-American civic
participation in state policymaking. See 2017 Immigration Report, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE
LEGISLATURES (Feb. 12, 2018), https://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/2017-immigrationreport.aspx.
158. See, e.g., infra notes 164–165.
159. See, e.g., Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV.
1703, 1707 (2018); Ming H. Chen, Trust in Immigration Enforcement: State Noncooperation and
Sanctuary Cities After Secure Communities, 91 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 13, 43 (2016); Rose Cuison
Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary?,” 61 SMU L. REV. 133, 148 (2008); Clare Huntington, The
Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 787, 799–804 (2008);
Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV.
567, 591–93 (2008); Wishnie, supra note 14, at 494–96.
160. This is roughly the same “[t]ypology” that Cristina Rodríguez gave in 2008, indicating how
little trends have since changed. Rodríguez, supra note 159, at 591 (“State and local measures
designed to prevent or diminish unauthorized immigration can be broken down roughly into three
categories: direct enforcement, indirect enforcement, and benefits restriction.”). For scholarship
that attends to the issue of access to benefits for noncitizens who are state residents, see, for example,
Markowitz, supra note 11, at 906–11; Burch Elias, supra note 11, at 734–48; Huntington, supra
note 159, at 803–04; Stephen H. Legomsky, Immigration, Federalism, and the Welfare State, 42
UCLA L. REV. 1453, 1460–62 (1995).
161. On antidiscrimination laws, see Burch Elias, supra note 11, at 734. On noncitizen voting,
see supra note 12. Other scholars have begun to point to the relative narrowness of scholarship on
immigration federalism, noting that regulation of undocumented immigrants occurs outside of these
areas of traditional focus. See Sarkar, supra note 56, at 1564–65 (noting focus in scholarship on
state and federal law on “policing,” “labor law,” “higher education,” “professional licensing,”
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of measure tends to be duplicative of federal laws prohibiting alienage
discrimination, and the latter is rare, existing in just a few cities in the United
States.162
These trends are not an accident: Benefits and enforcement in particular
have been focuses of federal immigration policy and politics over the past
few decades.163 Benefits became an area of intense state legislative activity
in response to the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (“PRWORA”), which both cut federal welfare
benefits for immigrants and gave states power to deny other welfare
benefits.164 The passage of PRWORA precipitated a flurry of bills that in
most cases aided immigrants by replacing retracted federal benefits with a
state substitute.165 More recently, immigrant rights advocates have
campaigned hard—and, in many cases, successfully—to extend a variety of
state benefits and programs to undocumented immigrants and other
noncitizens, including college financial aid and coronavirus relief money.166
“private humanitarian aid,” and so-called “welfare benefits”). Though I would group these three
areas of regulation into the categories of enforcement (policing), benefits (higher education,
humanitarian aid, and welfare), and antidiscrimination (labor law and professional licensing), I
share Sarkar’s sense that the literature would benefit from taking a broader focus, perhaps by
resisting the tendency to react purely to federal policy and to instead consider the possibilities that
might exist outside of the framework the federal government sets.
162. See supra note 12.
163. See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live With Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627,
1627–30 (1997) (noting dominance of federal control of immigration was virtually unchallenged
for the twentieth century until the 1990s and the passage of PRWORA); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Taking Immigration Federalism Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 60 (noting “[a]nxieties over
whether states would follow the federal government’s lead in restricting public benefits for
immigrants after [the federal government’s] 1996 immigration reforms”).
164. Pub. L. 104-193, 110 Stat. 2105; see also Schuck, supra note 163, at 60. PRWORA was
itself triggered by increasing skepticism about immigrants’ receipt of benefits at the state level,
culminating in the 1994 passage of California’s Proposition 187, which restricted undocumented
immigrants from virtually all public benefits. Kathleen A. Connolly, Comment, In Search of the
American Dream: An Examination of Undocumented Students, In-State Tuition, and the Dream Act,
55 CATH. U. L. REV. 193, 202 (2005).
165. One study found that in two years after PRWORA, twenty-eight states had passed
legislation making immigrants eligible for at least one state benefits program, fifteen had passed
legislation for at least two, ten had passed legislation for at least three, and two had passed legislation
for four. WENDY ZIMMERMANN & KAREN C. TUMLIN, URB. INST., PATCHWORK POLICIES: STATE
ASSISTANCE
FOR
IMMIGRANTS
UNDER
WELFARE
REFORM
22–23
(1999),
https://www.urban.org/sites/default/files/publication/69586/309007-Patchwork-Policies-StateAssistance-for-Immigrants-under-Welfare-Reform.PDF.
166. For instance, in 2020 and 2021, advocates won access to state relief funding to help
undocumented people cope with the impacts of COVID-19 in several states, including New York,
New Jersey, California, and Illinois. See Karen Yi, NJ Finally Opens Applications For $40 Million
Excluded Worker Fund, GOTHAMIST (Oct. 28, 2021, 12:58 AM), https://gothamist.com/news/njfinally-opens-applications-40-million-excluded-worker-fund; Resources for Undocumented
Immigrants and Their Families During COVID-19, MY UNDOCUMENTED LIFE,
https://mydocumentedlife.org/2020/03/30/resources-for-undocumented-immigrants-and-theirfamilies-during-covid-19 (last updated Jan. 2021). Over years of campaigns, activists in several
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State enforcement measures, meanwhile, have ebbed and flowed with
federal immigration policy but also became much more common beginning
in the 1990s. In 1996, Congress created the 287(g) program as part of the
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”),
allowing state and local police officers to collaborate with the federal
government in enforcing immigration laws.167 One year later, the Supreme
Court affirmed the rights of states and localities to decline to participate in
federal law enforcement activity with its decision in Printz v. United
States.168 These twin developments set the stage for state and local attempts
to manipulate levels of immigration into states by engaging in or declining to
participate in enforcement collaboration—for instance, by creating
“sanctuary” states or cities where local law enforcement and other officials
do not cooperate with ICE.169 Most recently, states and local governments
have passed a wave of sanctuary laws and regulations that forbid local law

states won access to state college financial aid for undocumented youth who are otherwise ineligible
for federal funds. California, Colorado, Minnesota, New Mexico, Oregon, Texas, and Washington
currently allow undocumented students to receive state financial aid thanks in great part to the work
of these organizers. See Undocumented Student Tuition: Overview, NAT’L CONF. STATE
LEGISLATURES (June 9, 2021), https://www.ncsl.org/research/education/undocumented-studenttuition-overview; Jacqueline Rabe Thomas et al., Financial Aid for ‘Dreamers’ Becomes a Reality
in Connecticut, CT MIRROR (Apr. 25, 2018), https://ctmirror.org/2018/04/25/financial-aiddreamers-becomes-reality-connecticut; see also Burch Elias, supra note 11, at 743–48.
167. Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009–546; see also Delegation of Immigration Authority Section
287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, ICE, https://www.ice.gov/287g (last updated Dec. 15,
2021).
168. 521 U.S. 898, 925–26 (1997). Though the Printz decision dealt directly with state noncooperation in federal gun control efforts, the principle it stands for has been helpful to states
resisting cooperation with federal immigration enforcement. See Hannah Michalove, Comment,
Expanding Printz in the Sanctuary City Debate, 40 CAMPBELL L. REV. 237, 239–43 (2018); Ilya
Somin, Opinion, Federalism, the Constitution, and Sanctuary Cities, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/11/26/federalism-theconstitution-and-sanctuary-cities. An action New York City brought immediately after IIRIRA to
declare unconstitutional one provision promoting federal and local immigration enforcement
cooperation relied heavily on the reasoning in Printz as grounds for striking down that portion of
the law. See City of New York v. United States, 179 F.3d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1999).
169. See HIROSHI MOTOMURA, IMMIGRATION OUTSIDE THE LAW 58–59, 72–76 (2014). For a
broad overview of sanctuary jurisdiction policies in place across the country, see CONG. RSCH.
SERV., R44795, “SANCTUARY” JURISDICTIONS: FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL POLICIES AND
RELATED LITIGATION (2019),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44795.pdf
[hereinafter
“SANCTUARY” JURISDICTIONS]. Other jurisdictions entered into agreements or passed measures to
heighten and facilitate state cooperation with federal immigration enforcement or to indirectly
discourage immigrants from staying in a jurisdiction. See Rodríguez, supra note 159, at 591–93.
Perhaps the most infamous attempt to increase enforcement through state-federal cooperation,
Arizona’s S.B. 1070, was partially struck down on federal preemption grounds in Arizona v. United
States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), demonstrating that there are some limits on how far states can go,
beyond what federal law itself requires, to promote more aggressive immigration enforcement. See,
e.g., id. at 401–10.
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enforcement from cooperating with ICE,170 while some immigrantexclusionary jurisdictions have passed a wide array of housing, employment,
benefits, and criminal laws designed to encourage immigrants to “selfdeport.”171
What is clear, looking back on this activity, is that immigration
federalism has generally reacted to changes in federal law, like the passage
of PRWORA and IIRIRA—not a surprise, given the federal government’s
plenary authority to regulate admission and removal and the way that
authority ultimately structures all immigrants’ relationships with this
country.172 It is understandable that, in a federal system, states and the people
who study them would react to this federal focus. However, as Part I clearly
demonstrates, states need not be limited in their thinking by what the federal
government does.
Because so much of immigration federalism is reactive to federal law,
it does not contest the federal paradigm for who is within the circle of
concern, let alone for who possesses membership in the community of rightsholders. This paradigm is fundamentally territorially based. As our
constitutional jurisprudence currently draws the line, noncitizens on the
territory of the United States have some rights; noncitizens abroad, off of
U.S. territory, go relatively unprotected, even from aggressive forms of
infringement on their wellbeing, like targeted killings or indefinite detention
(to take just two examples).173 This principle, known in immigration law as
the “territorial distinction,”174 has since been constricted even further at the

170. See generally “SANCTUARY” JURISDICTIONS, supra note 169, at 11–14 (surveying
sanctuary measures in a variety of jurisdictions).
171. For an authoritative historical summary of the concept of “self-deportation” as it emerged
in recent years, see K-Sue Park, Self-Deportation Nation, 132 HARV. L. REV. 1878, 1880–82 (2019).
Park defines “self-deportation” as the strategy of “mak[ing] individuals into agents of the state’s
goal of their removal by making their lives unbearable.” Id. at 1882.
172. See Spiro, supra note 163, at 1628–30.
173. This is to some extent an oversimplification, as (for instance) scholars closely following the
Guantanamo Military Commissions might argue. See supra note 16 (collecting Guantanamo habeas
cases). However, the shades of nuance in these cases, while important in context, are orthogonal to
my more general point about the overwhelming predominance in our constitutional jurisprudence
of a territorial paradigm for allocating rights to noncitizens. This paradigm and the binary
distinction it draws are well established. As Justice Murphy articulated the territorial distinction in
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring):
The Bill of Rights is a futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to
these shores. But once an alien lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes
invested with the rights guaranteed by the Constitution . . . . includ[ing] those protected
by the First and the Fifth Amendments and by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
174. See Charles D. Weisselberg, The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives
of Ellen Knauff and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933, 938 (1995).
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margins175 but continues to structure our constitutional immigration
jurisprudence in a deep way.176
The territorial distinction is also visible—and in some ways more
striking—in other areas of the law, where unlike in the immigration context
it may run counter to our expectations. For example, in United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez,177 the Supreme Court considered a constitutional
challenge to the legality of a search and seizure brought by a Mexican citizen
and resident who sought to suppress evidence brought into his U.S. trial for
drug smuggling.178 The defendant was a suspected narcotrafficker who was
arrested in Mexico and brought to the United States for trial by the Drug
Enforcement Agency (“DEA”).179 After receiving the permission of the
Mexican government, but without obtaining a warrant, DEA agents searched
the defendant’s home and found what they believed to be records of drug
shipments.180
Both the district court and Ninth Circuit agreed with the defendant that
the Fourth Amendment required a warrant, given that Verdugo-Urquidez was
subjected to a U.S. criminal trial, and ordered the evidence suppressed.181
The Supreme Court reversed.182 Analyzing the text of the Fourth
Amendment, the Court looked to founding era sources to conclude that “it
was never suggested that [the Fourth Amendment] was intended to restrain
the actions of the Federal Government against aliens outside of the United
States territory.”183 Though Verdugo-Urquidez was being criminally tried in
a U.S. court and facing a lengthy sentence in this country, the Supreme Court
175. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam
upheld the basic principle of not allocating rights to noncitizens outside of U.S. territory, but also
purported to further narrow the group of rightsholders by insisting that a noncitizen who merely
crosses a few feet beyond the U.S. border is not sufficiently on the territory to receive due process
protections. 140 S. Ct. 1959, 1982–83 (2020). It is not hard to imagine the ambiguous dictum at
the end of the opinion that offers this view leading to years of litigation over the precise geographical
location within the territory where these rights inhere.
176. See Weisselberg, supra note 174, at 936–38. Compare Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344
U.S. 590, 596 (1953) (granting lawful resident who had been traveling for several months due
process protections after “assimilat[ing] [his] status to that of an alien continuously residing and
physically present in the United States”), with Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155,
158–59, 173–74 (1993) (permitting detention of Haitian asylum seekers at Guantanamo because
they were intercepted on the high seas), and Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 766 (1972)
(finding no due process floor in U.S. Constitution for the processing and award or denial of visas to
noncitizens outside the U.S.), and United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544
(1950) (same).
177. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
178. Id. at 262–63.
179. Id. at 262.
180. Id. at 262–63.
181. Id. at 263.
182. Id. at 275.
183. Id. at 266–67.

540

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:503

found that even his territorial presence at trial and the heavy exercise of
federal power over him did not create “sufficient connection with this
country”—at least in the absence of other personal ties—to entitle him to
Fourth Amendment protection from a search in Mexico.184
Though a criminal procedure case involving a federal drug smuggling
prosecution, Verdugo-Urquidez is routinely discussed by immigration
scholars interested in the deep structure of how the Constitution allocates
rights to noncitizens because the territorial distinction is so clear.185
Territoriality is the defining factor that mediates the defendant VerdugoUrquidez’s rights: Over pages and pages, the Court distinguishes nearly a
dozen cases granting noncitizens constitutional protections on the grounds
that “[t]hese cases . . . establish only that aliens receive constitutional
protections when they have come within the territory of the United States and
developed substantial connections with this country.”186 Verdugo-Urquidez
is one of the clearest recent statements in all of U.S. constitutional law of the
overriding importance of the territorial distinction in allocating rights.187
Ultimately, our constitutional immigration and alienage jurisprudence
operates on the same principles articulated with such force in this criminal
procedure case. Even most immigrants who enter without inspection have
generally expected to receive some due process rights in removal

184. Id. at 265.
185. See, e.g., GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS,
BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 103–08 (2010) (situating Verdugo-Urquidez within broader
debate over extraterritorial scope of both constitutional protections and the underlying moral
obligations they reflect as they relate to noncitizens); D. Carolina Núñez, Inside the Border, Outside
the Law: Undocumented Immigrants and the Fourth Amendment, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 86, 92,
103 (2011) (analyzing Verdugo-Urquidez, counter to this Article, as “evidence of an emerging
‘post-territorial’ approach to membership,” due to its reference to “sufficient connections”);
Margaret H. Taylor, Detained Aliens Challenging Conditions of Confinement and the Porous
Border of the Plenary Power Doctrine, in 3 SHARK INFESTED WATERS: PROCEDURAL DUE
PROCESS IN CONSTITUTIONAL IMMIGRATION LAW 129, 177 (Gabriel J. Chin, Victor C. Romero &
Michael A. Scaperlanda eds., 2000) (noting Verdugo-Urquidez as a relevant example of the Court
“withholding constitutional protection from aliens even when the governmental conduct at issue is
not an exercise of the federal immigration power”).
186. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 270–73.
187. A competitor would have to be the Court’s infamous statement in United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp. that “[n]either the Constitution nor the laws passed in pursuance of it have any
force in foreign territory unless in respect of our own citizens.” 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
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proceedings188 and are entitled (at a minimum) to First,189 Fourth,190 Fifth,191
Sixth,192 and Fourteenth193 Amendment protections while on U.S. soil.
Meanwhile, would-be entrants outside the United States often are entitled to
no more due process in immigration than federal agencies and their
employees discretionarily give them194—nor, as Verdugo-Urquidez
exemplifies, do they receive many other constitutional protections despite the
U.S. government’s rather frequent propensity to exercise its authority
abroad.195 This framework is not unique to immigration law. International
law and national security law scholars well know that the same reasoning
pervades both current and historical decisions determining the rights of
188. See, e.g., Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001) (“[O]nce an alien enters the country,
the legal circumstance changes, for the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”);
Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (“[A]liens who have once
passed through our gates, even illegally, may be expelled only after proceedings conforming to
traditional standards of fairness encompassed in due process of law.”). But see supra note 175
(discussing Thuraissigiam’s dicta constricting the allocation of rights, so that entrants without
inspection may now not be sufficiently on the territory if they just barely cross the border into the
United States).
189. Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 162 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring).
190. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1984) (appearing to assume that some
Fourth Amendment protections apply in a deportation proceeding, in an opinion that ultimately held
respondent’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated).
191. Russian Volunteer Fleet v. United States, 282 U.S. 481, 489 (1931) (just compensation
clause applies to noncitizens whose property the U.S. government expropriates); Wong Wing v.
United States, 163 U.S. 228, 238 (1896) (due process clause applies to protect noncitizens in the
United States from arbitrary punishment).
192. Wong Wing, 163 U.S. at 238.
193. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 211–12 (1982); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369
(1886).
194. Under the doctrine of consular non-reviewability, a noncitizen outside the territory of the
United States has no judicially enforceable right to enter, such that many decisions by consular
officials to deny a visa are not even subject to judicial review. See United States ex rel. Knauff v.
Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950) (“Whatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it is
due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”). The only exception occurs where the
reason proffered for a denial is not “facially legitimate and bona fide.” See Kleindienst v. Mandel,
408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972). The Court has since indicated that the bar for a facially legitimate and
bona fide reason is low; a pro forma citation to a specific statutory provision as a reason for denial
is enough. See Kerry v. Din, 576 U.S. 86, 102 (2015) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
195. For instance, it is perfectly permissible for the U.S. government to deny a person a visa
based on statements they have made, whereas precisely that same speech would likely be protected
by the First Amendment were the noncitizen located in the United States. Compare Mandel, 408
U.S. at 769–70 (refusing to review denial of visa to Marxist academic), and United States ex rel.
Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 292–94 (1904) (authorizing denial of visa to British anarchist),
with Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, 161–62 (1945) (Murphy, J., concurring) (holding First
Amendment protected statements of Australian citizen and U.S. resident who was labor activist).
That said, there are concerning indications that the First Amendment rights of even resident
noncitizens are increasingly under attack as a matter of both constitutional law and government
policy. See Michael Kagan, When Immigrants Speak: The Precarious Status of Non-Citizen Speech
Under the First Amendment, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1237, 1238–39 (2016).
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defendants in military tribunals,196 of Guantanamo detainees,197 and of
residents of U.S.-occupied possessions.198 Of course, these decisions are
framed in terms of “rights” because they involve protections (or the lack
thereof) for noncitizens in a U.S. legal proceeding. But their translation to
our concept of the “circle of concern” is straightforward: Substantive
outcomes for noncitizens are of little concern to the United States when those
noncitizens are not on our territory.
The territorial distinction is not unique to the United States but is
pervasive throughout world legal systems. The way nations grant citizenship
is one obvious example. Some nations, like the United States and nearly all
countries in the Western Hemisphere, confer citizenship on virtually all
people born on the territory of the state.199 Other nations, including most in
Europe and Asia and the majority in Africa, confer citizenship primarily
through parentage rather than by “the law of the soil.”200 Even in the case of
jus sanguinis, or “law of blood” countries, however, the right to citizenship
is linked to originating on the land of a particular nation via the concept of
ethnicity, which is almost always territorially mediated (even if in an ancient
prehistory).201
196. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 767–68 (1950) (finding respondents not entitled to
seek habeas relief because they were tried by military tribunal in a theater of war and never within
the territorial jurisdiction of the United States).
197. Notably, the Supreme Court has found that Guantanamo detainees’ right to seek habeas
corpus is protected by the Suspension Clause. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008).
The status of other constitutional protections is less certain and the subject of ongoing litigation in
the D.C. Circuit, but it would be fair to say that they do not apply fulsomely to detainees. See Robert
Loeb, Due Process for Guantanamo Detainees: The D.C. Circuit Rules in Qassim, LAWFARE (June
25, 2019, 4:09 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/due-process-guantanamo-detainees-dc-circuitrules-qassim (describing ongoing back-and-forth on application of Fifth Amendment Due Process
to Guantanamo detainees in the narrow case of their pursuit of habeas review).
198. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico [sic], 258 U.S. 298, 304–05, 313 (1922) (finding no Sixth
Amendment right to jury trial in Puerto Rico); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914)
(finding no Fifth Amendment grand jury requirement in Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195
U.S. 138, 143–46 (1904) (finding no right to jury trial in Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S.
197, 203, 217–18 (1903) (finding no right to jury trial or indictment by grand jury in Hawaii). These
decisions are collectively known as the Insular Cases. For an in-depth discussion of the debate over
the extraterritoriality of the Constitution as it related to Puerto Rico, see generally Juan R. Torruella,
Ruling America’s Colonies: The Insular Cases, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 57 (2013).
199. See LIBR. OF CONG., LL FILE NO. 2018-017010, BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AROUND THE
WORLD 1–2, (2018) [herinafter BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AROUND THE WORLD]; Katherine
Culliton-González, Born in the Americas: Birthright Citizenship and Human Rights, 25 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 127, 135–36 (2012) (listing laws establishing jus soli citizenship, most via
constitutions, in the vast majority of countries in the Americas).
200. See BIRTHRIGHT CITIZENSHIP AROUND THE WORLD, supra note 199.
201. See DORA KOSTAKOPOULOU, THE FUTURE GOVERNANCE OF CITIZENSHIP 26–27 (2008).
This is somewhat of an oversimplification of the world’s patchwork of citizenship laws, which
frequently combine elements of jus sanguinis and jus soli. While this Article is certainly indebted
to and relies on a rich body of work on membership theory, a deep analysis and comparison of the
nuances of the philosophical underpinnings of different countries’ citizenship laws is outside its
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Nor have the moral problems that the territorial distinction engenders
escaped notice. Both human rights thinkers and democratic theorists—many
of whom have much to say about the problems affecting migrants—have long
been preoccupied with the overriding problem of how to make sovereigns
treat all people whose lives they touch as within the circle of concern, often
with a particular focus on those not in the political community or on the
territory of the state. The idea that sovereigns should be accountable to those
people who their actions touch is sometimes called the “all-affected
principle,”202 though similar concepts have been referred to under a variety
of names.203 In democratic theory, the all-affected principle is one response
to what democratic theorists call the “boundary problem,” or the question of
how to draw the boundaries of the political community.204 The concept of
the boundary problem can illuminate current normative debates in legal
scholarship and U.S. politics about how we set the limits of our political
community, and, relatedly, how we decide when those who do not participate
politically nonetheless should enjoy rights.205 The normative commitments
of immigrant inclusionists tend to align with the all-affected principle,206
scope. For a seminal analysis of the interplay of territorial and parentage-based theories of
citizenship and the inequalities they engender in access to rights, see generally AYELET SHACHAR,
THE BIRTHRIGHT LOTTERY: CITIZENSHIP AND GLOBAL INEQUALITY (2009).
202. See, e.g., Sofia Näsström, The Challenge of the All-Affected Principle, 59 POL. STUD. 116,
117 (2011).
203. Some version of this argument has been around since John Stuart Mill, but a classic recent
articulation of this position is ROBERT A. DAHL, AFTER THE REVOLUTION?: AUTHORITY IN A GOOD
SOCIETY 49–63 (1970). See also SEYLA BENHABIB, THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS: ALIENS, RESIDENTS,
AND CITIZENS 14 (2004) (characterizing all affected principle as extending “the moral
conversation” around state action to all those touched by it “potentially extending to all of
humanity”); IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 22–24 (2000) (characterizing
inclusion of all affected by decisionmaking on equal terms as fundamental to deliberative models
of democracy); JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: CONTRIBUTIONS TO A
DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY 450 (1996) (presuming inclusion of all affected by
laws in their formulation as basic precondition of law’s legitimacy). See generally Näsström, supra
note 202 (addressing conditions under which the group of all affected people can be legitimately
bounded and defined (that is, not by the group itself)).
204. See, e.g., Näsström, supra note 202, at 116–17.
205. In this Article, we are not talking yet about including all affected people within the political
community—merely about treating them as within the group whose substantive outcomes we care
about. Yet many democratic theorists would suggest that inclusion in the political community is
ultimately the only effective way to guarantee that people are also within the circle of concern.
206. One of the reasons to adopt the all-affected principle, according to some of its proponents,
is that it can serve as a check on the tendency of government to oppress certain minority groups.
See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 203, at 21–22. This concern will be more than familiar to people who
have some exposure to both the immigrant rights movement in the United States and to human rights
thinking. While human rights are concerned with the distribution of rights-holding rather than
decision-making, for some human rights thinkers these ultimately may be two sides of the same
coin. See CAROL C. GOULD, GLOBALIZING DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 1–3 (2004). While
an all-affected democracy is not necessary for the realization of human rights, some thinkers whose
work is associated with the human rights movement, perhaps chief among them Hannah Arendt,
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which suggests that a morally defensible boundary for the political
community must include all persons affected by decision-making.207
This group of “all affected” people encompasses noncitizens on a
country’s territory. But also, and beyond this, it may include everyone from
citizens of a foreign state that the country’s military is occupying to people
in developing nations who are affected by the country’s greenhouse gas
emissions—and, yes, former immigrants whom the country has subsequently
deported but who retain close ties there.208 The question of how to follow the
moral intuition that all affected should receive some degree of say has been
so vexing precisely because political membership and rights-holding in most
nation-states, as in the United States, is linked in a deep way to territoriality.
U.S. immigration federalism rarely if ever directly engages with the
territorial distinction and the universal system of inclusion and exclusion that
it structures. Ultimately, the benefits and enforcement laws that have typified
most immigration federalism do not trouble or undermine the territorial
distinction that structures all rights-holding under federal law. An immigrant
who is residing on the territory of a state may receive (or lose) benefits or be
protected by (or exposed to) enforcement so long as they are living within
state borders. These protections, however, do not follow them after they
leave. A state’s enforcement protections end as soon as an immigrant drives
or walks across its border to its neighbor; and without state residence, the
immigrant is not eligible for state benefits, just as any person making an
interstate move would lose these benefits.
As Part I shows with specific examples of law and policy reforms that
would enact citizenship federalism, there is nothing to stop states from more
deeply interrogating the dominant model for drawing the circle of concern,
have been preoccupied with the relationship between a minority group’s lack of membership in a
state’s political community and the resulting lack of protection from depredations by both the state
and third parties. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 267–304 (1966); see
also BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 49–64. The formal international human rights mechanisms were
conceived precisely to provide a backstop beyond political membership as a safeguard to protect
minority rights—minorities could seek recourse and protection within an extranational system—but
their inadequacy as a safeguard has been a constant theme since their establishment and is
continually invoked by critics today. See ARENDT, supra, at 270–304; see also, e.g., ERIC A.
POSNER, THE TWILIGHT OF HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 1–8, 41–44 (2014) (describing failures by the
international human rights framework and bodies to prevent atrocities, including in supposed human
rights respecting countries, as grounds to declare the international human rights project defunct).
207. To some extent, though they seek to answer a similar question to membership theorists—
whose work U.S. immigration scholars draw on more routinely—the most stalwart proponents of
the all-affected principle are fundamentally at odds with membership theorists because they do not
recognize any legitimate membership-based constraints on inclusion in decision-making. See
BENHABIB, supra note 203, at 14–15; see also Joseph H. Carens, Aliens and Citizens: The Case for
Open Borders, in THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229 (Ronald Beiner ed., 1995).
208. Some democratic theorists have expressly addressed the rights of emigrants in the country
of origin; deportees are in a similar posture. See Näsström, supra note 202, at 119.
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attempting to protect individuals beyond their territory, or defining their own
political community differently than federal constitutional law or federal
policy define the nation’s. Indeed, states that seek to contest federal power
and federal policy—as many have in recent years—might deliberately seek
to challenge the territorial distinction by engaging in citizenship federalism.
This Article is not the first to observe that states could articulate a
different boundary for political membership in a way that would challenge
the federal government and move the national conversation.209 Yet generally,
this conversation has been limited to the relatively straightforward proposals
of noncitizen state citizenship and noncitizen voting, which explicitly extend
membership in the state political community to people who are not citizens
at the federal level.210 These proposals are both more and less radical than
those discussed in Part I of this Article: more so because they bluntly strike
at our values around political membership by moving directly to the granting
of state citizenship or voting rights, yet also less so because they do not
challenge the territorial distinction or imagine how states could apply
cosmopolitan values when allocating rights at the local level.
This Article demonstrates that a broader challenge from the states is
possible. There are many ways to extend important civil rights to former
immigrants not on the territory of the United States—people who in the eyes
of the Federal Constitution are virtually “rights-less.” By continuing to
protect the property, parental rights, and access to proof of identity of
deported people, states can begin to challenge the territorial distinction and
entire paradigm that structures our approach to rights-holding. This shift in
mindset about who is within the circle of concern could apply not only to
immigration, but to other contexts that implicate global obligations and
impacts, like the climate crisis.211 Moving beyond territory, states might
choose to make laws and policies that prioritize linkages and obligations
based on family ties, property ties, or engagement with state institutions—as
209. Markowitz expressly frames his proposal for state citizenship for undocumented people in
terms of its expressive effect and potential for spurring a conversation around values at the national
level, writing:
By declaring undocumented members of society to be citizens, states can express, in the
most powerful political terms, their judgment that these individuals have become so
integrated in, and so valuable to, our communities so as to warrant full political inclusion.
If multiple states were to adopt such citizenship schemes, the power of such declarations
could move our national conversation on immigration.
Markowitz, supra note 11, at 914; see also Peter J. Spiro, Formalizing Local Citizenship, 37
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 559, 560, 567 (2010).
210. See supra note 12.
211. A number of political theorists have taken environmental problems, and the difficulty of
cabining their effects to individual nation-states, as important grounds to adopt a cosmopolitan view
of justice that factors in people outside the territory of the state. See, e.g., David Held, Democracy
and Globalization, 3 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 251, 258–59 (1997).
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the examples in this Article naturally suggest. Or they might choose still
other criteria, such as historical relationships between the state’s community
and the communities of certain nations.212 Moreover, states can begin
practicing citizenship federalism by adopting measures that advocates can
easily connect to the separated families narrative and other recognized
symbols of the moral harm in our immigration system.
The legal reforms I have proposed in Part I may seem small, specific,
and particularized, rather than expressive of the need for fundamental change
to the immigration system or to our beliefs about the appropriate scope of the
circle of concern. But as part of a coordinated advocacy strategy, these
reforms have the potential to deeply interrogate our values regarding who has
a right to have rights, for the reasons discussed in this Section. Moreover,
the proposals in Part I and other ideas like them offer opportunities for
organizing and dialogue at a grassroots level, where social movement history
shows it is often easiest to begin the process of a transformative paradigmatic
shift.
B. Citizenship Federalism: Redefining the Subject of Rights
This Section takes a step back to evaluate both the practical applications
of citizenship federalism213 and its significance for legal scholars of
immigration, international migration, and federalism.214
1. The Activist’s or Policymaker’s Perspective
Since the 2016 election, immigrant rights organizations have increased
resources to states and cities,215 and have taken advantage of strong local
organizing and increased public sympathy to achieve significant wins at the
state, local,216 and even national levels, including the 2020 Supreme Court
decision upholding Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”).217
212. Certain states do have a link to particular nations or diasporic communities. For instance,
Texas and California have a long history of deep ties to Mexico, while Louisiana has ties to the
Francophone diaspora and a number of states have especially strong ties to the Black diaspora from
Africa.
213. See infra Section II.B.1.
214. See infra Section II.B.2.
215. RANDY CAPPS ET AL., MIGRATION POL’Y INST., REVVING UP THE DEPORTATION
MACHINERY:
ENFORCEMENT
AND
PUSHBACK
UNDER
TRUMP
4
(2018),
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ImmigrationEnforcementFullReport_FINALWEB.pdf.
216. See, e.g., id. at 57–61, 64–66 (chronicling wide variety of post-Trump state and local
reforms and non-cooperation policies, including sanctuary policies, legal representation programs
and efforts to curtail the expansion of immigration detention, all of which have significantly
hampered federal immigration enforcement).
217. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 140 S. Ct. 1891, 1901 (2020); see
also Rabe Thomas et al., supra note 166.
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Unlike two decades ago, when the immigrant rights movement first began to
engage systematically with state-level advocacy, today the mainstream of the
movement is asking for transformative, systemic change to the U.S.
immigration system, and urging state policymakers to support this goal.218
Some policymakers, for their part, have proven increasingly willing to accept
this challenge and throw their support behind inclusionary state-law
proposals.
Citizenship federalism naturally lends itself to a grassroots, local
advocacy strategy that could be particularly effective for shifting the deeply
held worldviews of individual voters. This advocacy might look different
than most current state-level immigration work. For instance, current
advocacy often focuses on families that are at risk of being permanently
separated.219 By contrast, advocacy centered on citizenship federalism might
focus on organizing and telling the stories of the families of deported people,
and deported people themselves, leading advocates to take on some
transnational organizing work.
The immigrant rights movement might choose to deploy citizenship
federalism, and this grassroots-focused strategy, for four reasons. First, and
most obviously, citizenship federalism can help change the public’s view of
which noncitizens fall within our circle of concern, in both the immigration
context and more broadly.
Second, because it highlights the rights and claims of deported former
community members, citizenship federalism can help call into question the
legitimacy of deportation, even as it works practically to extend rights to
people with close community ties. Citizenship federalism calls attention to
the ways that former immigrants are inextricably linked to our communities
and our society in the United States. In so doing, it asks us to consider
whether future deportations are justifiable or socially beneficial.
Third, over the long term, advocates who engage with citizenship
federalism could create advocacy momentum for a “right to return” to the
218. The level of ambition is reflected in the platform that immigration advocacy group United
We Dream and its allied organizations put forth in the Democratic primary. The “Free to Move,
Free to Stay” platform proposes (1) legislation that creates a pathway to citizenship without
additional funding for enforcement, a rejection of recent legislation that conditioned legalization on
enforcement; (2) a 100-day moratorium on all deportations; (3) closure of all immigration detention
facilities within 100 days; (4) defunding and dismantling of ICE and CBP; and (5) restructuring of
the visa system to better serve the needs of families and communities. See Free to Move, Free to
Stay: A New Framework on Immigration for Progressives, UNITED WE DREAM ACTION,
https://unitedwedreamaction.org/framework-2020 (last visited Aug. 4, 2020).
219. For instance, many state and local advocates have focused largely on ending the use of
immigration detention and on stopping the detention and deportation of individual community
members. While these are worthy advocacy battles, they primarily center around people and
families who have not yet been deported, as opposed to those that have already experienced
deportation.
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United States for deported former immigrants. At this point, the possibility
of rejoining their loved ones in the United States is remote for many deported
people.220 Increasingly, however, political momentum is gathering for the
idea that some deported former immigrants should be able to return. In 2021,
for the first time, United We Dream included in its policy platform a demand
that deported people be allowed to return to the United States.221 Shortly
thereafter, the Biden Administration began allowing a small number of
families who were separated at the border to reunify in the United States,222
and announced that it would create a review process to potentially reverse
select deportations, including those of veterans.223
Though this
individualized review process stops short of a generalized right,224 a window
may have opened to make a right to return politically viable. To continue
moving this concept into the mainstream, advocates could begin a
conversation at the grassroots level about the lives, challenges, and rights of
these deported loved ones, just as the marriage equality movement managed
a transformative shift in the way Americans viewed marriage by starting with
messaging and advocacy to change local views.225
Fourth and finally, citizenship federalism offers a way to begin thinking
and organizing at the grassroots level across borders around broader issues
of global justice that have become complicated to broach in an environment
220. In the U.S. context, creating a “right to return” that goes beyond the review of individual
deportations might involve, for instance, enacting legislation to modify, eliminate, or expand
waivers for the three-, five-, and ten-year unlawful presence bars to reentry, the permanent criminal
and immigration violation bars, and related restrictions on admission to the United States to allow
for the readmission of some previously deported people. It might also require re-envisioning how
we prioritize new migration to privilege people with the strongest family and social ties to the United
States. As this concept becomes increasingly politically salient, further development of the legal
changes that would have to occur to enact a right to return may be warranted. See CALDWELL,
supra note 6, at 186–88 (pointing to need for legislative reforms to allow some deported immigrants
to return to United States).
221. Protect Immigrants Now!, UNITED WE DREAM, https://unitedwedream.org/protectimmigrants-now/#demands (last visited Jan. 23, 2021) (listing organization’s demands for the first
100 days of the Biden Administration).
222. Miriam Jordan, Migrants Separated from Their Children Will Be Allowed into U.S., N.Y.
TIMES (July 27, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/05/03/us/migrant-family-separation.html.
223. Julia Preston, They Were Deported by Trump. Now Biden Wants to Bring Them Back.,
POLITICO (June 29, 2021, 4:30 AM), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2021/06/29/trumpdeported-immigrants-biden-return-496786.
224. The concept has some way to go politically. For instance, a right to return was not in the
expansive immigration bill that the Biden Administration sent to Congress when it took office.
Factbox: What’s in Biden’s Immigration Bill Proposal?, REUTERS (Jan. 20, 2021),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biden-immigration-bill-factbox/factbox-whats-in-bidensimmigration-bill-proposal-idUSKBN29P27G.
225. For a detailed account of how the marriage equality movement used various grassroots
advocacy strategies to win state-level changes, and ultimately create national momentum, see MARC
SOLOMON, WINNING MARRIAGE: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW SAME-SEX COUPLES TOOK ON THE
POLITICIANS AND PUNDITS—AND WON (2014).
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of increasing nationalism worldwide. To take just one example, there are
obvious differences between the group of former immigrants in particular,
and all would-be migrants generally. Nonetheless, transnational organizing
with former immigrants offers one possibility for supporters of the broader
rights to migrate and to move as they seek to follow the example of the U.S.
immigrant youth movement and build coalitions of affected people.
Despite the recent change in presidential administration, the road to
deep and lasting change in our immigration system is long.226 Incorporating
the perspective of citizenship federalism as they set state and local advocacy
priorities is one way advocates can gain tangible wins for a group of people
with deep moral claims on the United States, while spurring us to ask
profound questions about how we wish to define our local and national
communities.
2. Implications for Immigration, Migration, and Federalism
Scholars
Immigration and Migration
While immigration advocates have ambitious but clear goals for the
Biden Administration, immigration scholars may find themselves at a
crossroads, asking, “what’s next?” Four years of ugly legal conflict over
DACA and dozens of other immigration policies227 have cast some shadow
on the strategic centrality of constitutional impact litigation and executive
actions to attempt to shape our nation’s immigration system. Though
attorneys and impact litigators have clearly helped avert or delay harm to
many immigrants since 2016, the past decade of constitutional litigation over
immigrant rights has yielded a mixed record.228 While scholars continue to
226. See United We Dream (@UNITEDWEDREAM), TWITTER (June 18, 2020, 10:30 AM),
https://twitter.com/UNITEDWEDREAM/status/1273624163937386496 (“We won at the Supreme
Court — #DACA is here to stay! Today we celebrate & tomorrow we will continue to fight b/c
Trump’s attacks on the immigrant community must end.”); Sunrise Movement (@sunrisemvmt),
TWITTER
(June
22,
2020,
11:28
AM),
https://twitter.com/sunrisemvmt/status/1275088205340119050 (“DACA stays, for now, but the
fight isn’t over.”); see also Nicole Narea, The Supreme Court Kept DACA Alive – for Now.
DREAMers Still Face a Long Road Ahead., VOX (June 19, 2020, 10:00 AM),
https://www.vox.com/2020/6/19/21295528/supreme-court-daca-trump-congress-dream-act (noting
that legislative fix for Dreamers is necessary and the most durable pathway to status).
227. See MICHAEL A. OLIVAS, PERCHANCE TO DREAM: A LEGAL AND POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE DREAM ACT AND DACA 92–107 (2020) (describing litigation over validity of DACA and
using example of professional licensing to demonstrate how it has thrown many aspects of
Dreamers’ lives into confusion); see also id. at 108–16 (describing Trump Administration rescission
of DACA and the complicated background against which legal challenges ensued).
228. See id.; Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, Immigration Litigation in the Time of Trump, 53 U.C.
DAVIS
L.
REV.
ONLINE
121,
122–26,
128–29,
130–34,
138
(2019),
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/online/53/53-online-wadhia.html (detailing the mixed track
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produce valuable, important work that proposes or refines legal theories
consistent with these pathways to law reform, new ways of engaging with
immigration law in U.S. legal scholarship are warranted.
Hiroshi Motomura, surveying the current state of immigration
scholarship, has recently declared that “[o]nce every generation or so, entire
fields of law require a full reset,” and argued that the time has come for
immigration law scholarship.229 This Article has attempted to answer this
call in two ways: (1) by asking how we can use or mold immigration law not
just to win cases or create programs, but to shape immigration discourse and
policy;230 and (2) by placing our immigration system in a transnational
perspective.231
Each of these two moves has potential value to invigorate immigration
scholarship. As the Introduction to this Article notes, the first move—asking
how immigration law can be used to shape immigration discourse, policy,
and values—is at this moment an urgent one.
While questions of identity, race, and community belonging have
always been a key point of contention in U.S. politics, there are signs that a
political realignment is occurring that may make them the central axis of
dispute between the two political parties. As some Republicans move closer
to Democrats on economic and social policy, the likelihood increases that
they will distinguish themselves through a focus on identity politics, and
specifically immigration. For several decades, Republicans and Democrats
contested economic as well as identity issues, with Republicans advancing a
set of corporatist, anti-welfarist, and pro-business positions that included
lowering tax rates, shrinking the social safety net, and reducing the size of
record of victories and defeats for immigration impact litigators bringing constitutional and
administrative challenges to Trump Administration policies, including litigation over the Muslim
Ban (which the Supreme Court allowed to stand), Remain in Mexico (which is currently still in
place), and the rescission of DACA (which immigrant advocates won on administrative and lost on
equal protection grounds), and concluding that “the courts will not save us” and “the Constitution
has not always been the legal ‘hook’ for successful litigation”).
229. Hiroshi Motomura, The New Migration Law: Migrants, Refugees, and Citizens in an
Anxious Age, 105 CORNELL L. REV. 457, 458 (2020).
230. Given this Article’s focus on the relationship of legal scholarship (in this case, immigration
scholarship) to the goals of social movements to drive transformative change, it arguably fits within
the developing body of scholarship that Amna Akbar, Sameer Ashar, and Jocelyn Simonson have
termed “Movement Law.” See Amna A. Akbar et al., Movement Law, 73 STAN. L. REV. 821, 821–
22 (2021).
231. Such a transnational outlook is still relatively rare in U.S. immigration legal scholarship,
though some scholars have taken this approach. For a partial sampling, see, for example, Motomura,
supra note 229, at 499–517 (engaging with both human rights and development); E. Tendayi
Achiume, Migration as Decolonization, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1509, 1510 (2019) (applying normative
insights from postcolonial theory and third-world approaches to international law); Daniel
Kanstroom, The “Right to Remain Here” as an Evolving Component of Global Refugee Protection:
Current Initiatives and Critical Questions, 5 J. ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 614, 617–18 (2017)
(considering relationship to human rights discourse).
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government.232 Particularly since 2016, however, Republican economic
rhetoric has become more heterodox. Many of the party’s most prominent
figures (and likely 2024 presidential candidates) have embraced some
economic ideas usually associated with progressives.233 In rhetoric and to a
certain extent in policy, they are mirroring their colleagues on the left by
attacking large technology companies234 and other corporations235 and
expressing support for increased social spending.236 Perhaps the signal figure
of this realignment is Missouri Senator and presidential aspirant Josh
Hawley, who has gained nationwide attention both for his alignment with
progressive Democrats on certain economic issues, like pandemic cash

232. Republicans’ previous economic approach is exemplified by the 1994 Contract with
America, an electoral platform issued by Newt Gingrich and congressional Republicans that
committed the party to cutting government benefits and taxes and to slowing the creation of new
government regulations. See Republican Nat’l Comm., Republican Contract with America,
TEACHING AM. HIST. (Sept. 27, 1994), https://teachingamericanhistory.org/document/republicancontract-with-america/; see also Jeffrey B. Gaynor, The Contract with America: Implementing New
Ideas in the U.S., in THE HERITAGE FOUND., THE HERITAGE LECTURES (1995),
http://s3.amazonaws.com/thf_media/1995/pdf/hl549.pdf. The Contract with America drew on
economic ideas associated with the conservative wing of the party and the presidency of Ronald
Reagan, and Republicans’ congressional victory in the year’s elections ratified these views, helping
to cement them as party orthodoxy for many years to come. For an accounting of this narrative,
see, for example, John Steele Gordon, Time for a New Contract With America, AM. ENTER. INST.
(May 16, 2014), https://www.aei.org/articles/time-for-a-new-contract-with-america/.
Until
relatively recently, the ideas represented in the Contract With America were still the economic
platform of the vast majority of congressional Republicans, but since 2016, this consensus has begun
to dissipate. Compare, for instance, intense Republican opposition to the Obama Administration’s
2008–2009 economic bailout plans to Republican cooperation in President Trump’s coronavirus
stimulus packages in 2020.
233. Among those likely candidates most associated with economic populism, at least
rhetorically, are Josh Hawley, Marco Rubio, and Tom Cotton. See, e.g., Justin H. Vassallo,
Populism After Trump, AM. PROSPECT (Aug. 26, 2020), https://prospect.org/politics/populismafter-trump-josh-hawley/.
234. See, e.g., Dana Mattioli & Ryan Tracy, House Bills Seek to Break Up Amazon and Other
Big Tech Companies, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2021), https://www.wsj.com/articles/amazon-othertech-giants-could-be-forced-to-shed-assets-under-house-bill-11623423248; David McCabe, Seven
House Republicans Pledge to Take No Donations from Major Tech Companies., N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
21, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/04/21/technology/republican-lawmakers-big-tech.html.
235. Increasingly, some Trump-aligned Republicans have carved out a broader anti-corporate
position, asserting that conservatives are being targeted by companies that have taken positions on
voting rights and other political issues. See Brian Schwartz, GOP Donors, Leaders Discussed Plans
to Take on Big Tech, Corporations During Retreat at Trump’s Mar-a-Lago, CNBC (Apr. 14, 2021,
12:09
PM),
https://www.cnbc.com/2021/04/13/gop-donors-lawmakers-plot-next-attacks-oncorporate-america-big-tech-.html.
236. See Sahil Kapur & Allan Smith, The GOP Is Having a Change of Heart on Economics. It
Could Have Implications for Policymaking, NBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/congress/gop-having-change-heart-economics-it-could-haveimplications-policymaking-n1258863 (describing leftward shift by Republican Party on economic
issues, including usually conventional Senator Mitt Romney’s championing of an effort to expand
the child tax credit and raise the minimum wage).

552

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 81:503

relief,237 and for his expressions of support for the right-wing mob that
stormed the U.S. Capitol on January 6, 2021.238
These developments may inflame political conflict over immigration in
two ways. First, as some conservative politicians warm to the idea that
government should increase social spending, conflict over which
communities are the proper target of that spending may increase.239 Second,
when distinctions between the two parties on economic issues erode,
electoral battles may increasingly shift to other terrain,240 and issues of
identity and belonging are primed to become the focus of intense dispute.241
Whatever the reason, immigrants will be trapped in the middle of these
political fights. Immigration scholarship urgently needs to account not only
for the ways that legal developments and legal theories can reform or
transform components of our immigration system, but for the ways
immigration law can shape our underlying conception of who is within our
circle of concern and mold the realm of the politically possible. This task is
particularly urgent because of the role immigration law can potentially play
237. See, e.g., Lorie Konish, Sens. Bernie Sanders and Josh Hawley Team Up in Push for Second
$1,200 Stimulus Checks, BERNIE SANDERS: U.S. SENATOR FOR VT. (Dec. 11, 2020),
https://www.sanders.senate.gov/in-the-news/sens-bernie-sanders-and-josh-hawley-team-up-inpush-for-second-1200-stimulus-checks/.
238. A photo of Hawley with his fist raised in a defiant salute to the mob that later overwhelmed
the Capitol on January 6 has become perhaps the defining image of some congressional
Republicans’ perceived sympathy with the attackers, who were motivated by President Trump’s
false claims of election fraud. See Katie Bernard, A Photographer and a Fist Pump. The Story
Behind the Image That Will Haunt Josh Hawley, KAN. CITY STAR (Feb. 3, 2021, 11:54 AM),
https://www.kansascity.com/news/politics-government/article248354085.html.
239. This would be consistent with a broader dynamic on the political right that political
scientists in Europe have named “welfare chauvinism.” Welfare chauvinism describes a policy
stance that supports both a robust social safety net and restricted access to this safety net along
racial, ethnic, or national lines. See Zoe Lefkofridi & Elie Michel, The Electoral Politics of
Solidarity: The Welfare Agendas of Radical Right Parties, in THE STRAINS OF COMMITMENT: THE
POLITICAL SOURCES OF SOLIDARITY IN DIVERSE SOCIETIES 233–35 (Keith Banting & Will
Kymlicka eds., 2017) (surveying radical right parties across Europe, and finding that over time most
reframed their economic platforms to support welfare benefits but oppose their extension to
immigrants). Welfare chauvinism in Europe often comes coupled with extreme hostility to
immigrants, as exemplified by the platforms of right-wing European parties like Alternative for
Germany.
240. A traditional (and sometimes challenged) view of partisan change in political science
suggests that as parties become less polarized on certain issues, they become more polarized on
others, a process known as “conflict displacement.” See, e.g., JAMES L. SUNDQUIST, DYNAMICS OF
THE PARTY SYSTEM: ALIGNMENT AND REALIGNMENT OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED
STATES 13 (1983). In this view, as both the Republican and Democratic parties become increasingly
heterodox on economic issues, they ought to become more polarized and more active in contesting
other areas.
241. This phenomenon is already occurring, as political polarization over race and immigration
increases—interestingly, due to Democrats’ attitudes toward immigration becoming more positive
while Republicans’ remain the same. See Michael Hout & Christopher Maggio, Immigration, Race
& Political Polarization, DÆDALUS, Spring 2021, at 40, 41–42.
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in deescalating political conflicts over the boundaries of national community,
just as much as it has served to reinforce and deepen these conflicts in the
past.
Contextualizing the U.S. immigration system, including its subnational
components, within a system of global rights and transnational
relationships—as citizenship federalism pushes us to do—may also create
space for conversations, and ultimately action, to connect the United States
to debates around the need for and structure of a “global mobility” system.242
Placing deportation—or chosen departure—from the United States in the
broader context of an individual’s lifelong mobility trajectory can help
reorient our perspective, asking us to see the United States as merely one
option within an entire world of potential destinations for migrants. A more
widespread engagement with cosmopolitan currents may push us to look past
myths of American immigration exceptionalism243 that have arguably
blinded us to the actual needs, values, and preferences of migrants within the
immigration system. For instance, the same American exceptionalism
implicit in criticized concepts like earned citizenship244 can arguably also be
discerned in the views of advocates who see the widespread achievement of
U.S. citizenship for all immigrants (as opposed to, say, rock-solid protections
for migrant labor and unlimited freedom of movement) as the only relevant
goal of immigration reform.
For Federalism Scholars
Citizenship federalism may interest federalism scholars as well as
immigration scholars for two reasons. First, citizenship federalism places
emphasis on the expressive and morally normative dimensions of state
policymaking as it counter-defines itself against federal law and policy.
When it practices citizenship federalism, the state uses policy as an
242. Recent scholarship emerging initially from the refugee protection context has used the
concept of “global mobility” to reflect a need for a global system of migration governance that
attends to the needs of migrants outside traditional refugee protection categories. See, e.g., Thomas
Spijkerboer, The Global Mobility Infrastructure: Reconceptualizing the Externalisation of
Migration Control, 20 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. 452, 454, 464–67 (2018) (discussing global
mobility and the rights of migrants without differentiating refugees from other categories of
migrants); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Toward a Global System of Human Mobility: Three Thoughts,
111 AM. J. INT’L L. UNBOUND 24, 25 (2017) (arguing for use of “mobility” terminology broad
enough to encompass movement of peoples beyond individuals entitled to refugee protection).
243. See generally KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE “HUDDLED MASSES” MYTH: IMMIGRATION AND
CIVIL RIGHTS (2004) (providing a corrective to exceptionalist narratives by demonstrating the ways
that U.S. immigration law has at various times excluded the poor, people of color, and LGBT people,
among others).
244. See Muneer I. Ahmad, Beyond Earned Citizenship, 52 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 257, 279–
86 (2017) (discussing earned citizenship in the United States as both a desirable benefit attained by
performing “worthiness” and as a process of assimilation into a presumably desirable cultural
community).
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expressive tool for engaging in debate over the values embedded in national
law and policy. In highlighting this capacity of states, citizenship federalism
surfaces the potential of federalist systems to serve as sites of contestation
and discourse between sovereigns not just over policy preferences,245 but
over underlying values and norms, particularly those that define the
boundaries of community. Though a more extensive exploration of this
phenomenon is beyond the scope of the Article, interested federalism
scholars will find numerous examples of this type of expressive and
normative contestation between state and federal government in the history
of the Trump Administration and state reactions to its policies.
Second, citizenship federalism may generate new phenomena of interest
to scholars of foreign affairs federalism, who are already well aware of the
relevance of immigration federalism to their work.246 Citizenship federalism,
if put into practice, has the potential to generate significant state intervention
and interaction in the transnational arena. For example, as proposed in Part
I, states that engage in citizenship federalism may increase their collaboration
with child welfare agencies247 or migrant-receiving agencies248 in major
migrant-sending countries. This subnational collaboration may have
significant tangible benefits for both former and future immigrants to the
United States. On the theoretical side, it could also incrementally complicate
the status quo of federal supremacy in foreign affairs, using some of the areas
of regulation most clearly reserved to the states as a point of entry to
transnationally expand state action.
CONCLUSION
The deep challenges posed by our fractures over national belonging also
contain opportunities. They give us a chance to re-envision how our
immigration system—both as a freestanding entity and as one node in the
global movement of peoples—might more justly and more abundantly serve
migrants, their families, our society, and the world. In elaborating the
concept of citizenship federalism, this Article bridges the gap between a set
of plausible legal reforms and a shift in the territorial paradigm for who is
within our circle of concern. By so doing, it offers a path forward for
245. This feature of federalist systems was explored in Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K.
Gerken, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE L.J. 1256 (2009).
246. See, e.g., Daniel Abebe & Aziz Z. Huq, Foreign Affairs Federalism: A Revisionist
Approach, 66 VAND. L. REV. 723, 724–26 (2013) (noting federalism and preemption arguments
against Arizona S.B. 1070 and the relevance of the decision to foreign affairs federalism); Sarah H.
Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century
Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 81–162 (2002) (discussing
historical state immigration regulation).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 147–148.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 86–89, 96–98.
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rethinking our current territory-based conception of community, if we choose
to do so.
The open conflict we are having today about who is within our
American community is frightening and demoralizing, at times calling into
question the strength of our democratic institutions. At the same time, this
open conflict has surfaced longstanding issues of societal inclusion that we
must address. By thinking expansively about the ways law structures, and
can restructure, our American community, we can create space to re-envision
what the boundaries of that community should be.

